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  1. Introduction
1 
The paper explores the evolution of Italy’s performance in technological innovation since 
the country’s political unification, as a function of international technology transfer, openness to 
trade and other international economic relationships.  
In the 150 years under analysis, Italy moved from being a fragmented and mainly 
agricultural country to becoming one of the seven most industrialised countries in the world. 
Some researchers interpret Italian economic growth as a success story (Sapelli 1992; Federico 
1996), while others point out that Italy never closed the gap in technological capabilities with 
respect to its main industrialised competitors, failing to emerge as an original contributor to 
technology generation in the world economy (Malerba and Orsenigo 1995). 
One major weakness of the Italian economy has been identified in the relatively low levels 
of effort in the generation of technological knowledge, as measured by traditional indicators 
such as R&D activity or patents. Certainly, Italy does not display any significant comparative 
technological advantage, measured in terms of international patents (Cantwell 1991). Italian 
expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP is still much lower than the equivalent ratio in 
other major OECD countries; patenting activity in recent decades has been below the country’s 
economic weight. However, this is in part explained by the fact that Italian specialisation in 
production and technology has remained relatively concentrated in some traditional industries, 
in which innovation relies more on engineering and design than it does on R&D. 
Thus, owing to the accumulation of strong local capabilities in some of the longer 
standing fields of industrial development, more recent research on the second half of the 20th 
century has highlighted some important innovation achievements in Italian manufacturing, in 
terms of production processes and forms of organisation, product differentiation, and the 
development and diffusion of innovative machinery and intermediate inputs. High levels of total 
factor productivity growth have been mirrored by Italy’s successful export performance, 
especially through the resilience of the “made in Italy” products and the emergence of a relevant 
competitive international presence in related capital goods industries. In Italy in particular R&D 
statistics cover only a limited part of the production of technological knowledge used for 
industrial innovation, by mainly small and medium-sized firms (Malerba 1993). In fact, the 
innovative ability of Italian firms appears to be based, at least for a significant part of the second 
half of the 20th century, more on creative adoption processes and the systematic development of 
localised learning than on the mechanism of formal research in the laboratories of large 
corporations. 
If international trade in ideas has been recognised as a major factor in world growth in 
several studies (Coe and Helpman 1993; Eaton and Kortum 1996), the contribution of foreign 
technological knowledge in domestic technological innovation processes emerged as being 
particularly relevant in the Italian Golden Age of the 1950s and 1960s (Antonelli and Barbiellini 
Amidei 2007).  
                                                 
1 Corresponding author: federico.barbielliniamidei@bancaditalia.it. 
 
5This paper aims to reconstruct the evolution of Italian innovative effort, assessing 
different phases and dimensions of Italy’s technological catch-up, tracking the transfer of 
foreign technological knowledge, and analysing the impact of imported technology on recipient 
innovative activity performance. We also try to assess how Italian productivity growth was 
related to different forms and channels of international technology transfer in some relevant 
periods. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a conceptual discussion of the 
importance of innovation and technology transfer in economic growth. Section 3 provides 
historical overview of innovation and foreign technology in the context of Italian economic 
growth. The fourth, fifth and sixth Sections introduce and analyse the three blocks which make 
up the original dataset developed for this paper: variables on Italian innovative activity 
performance, foreign technology imports and domestic innovative capability, respectively. In 
these sections we discuss the evolution of the main indicators of the generation of technological 
knowledge; provide an analysis of the relative significance of the various channels for foreign 
technology imports and the characteristics of processes of absorptive and innovative capability 
formation in Italy in different historical phases; and place these in an international context. By 
doing so, these sections provide a first assessment of the magnitude and relevance of transfer of 
foreign technology to Italy. The seventh Section presents an econometric analysis of the impact 
of foreign technology on innovation and productivity growth. The last Section concludes. 
2.  Innovation, Economic Growth, and International Technology Transfer 
The major role of innovation, be it technological or associated organisational change, in 
economic growth and rising living standards is almost unanimously recognised (see e.g. Scherer 
1999). Technological change had a central role in the work of the classical economists such as 
Adam Smith, and Karl Marx. Schumpeter (1911) not only centred upon the role of technological 
change the explanation of economic growth, but he also, rejecting the assumption of exogenous 
technological change, in fact assumed that innovation and inherent transformation is an 
inalienable element of economic activity and therefore an indispensable interpretive element of 
any economic theory. The definition of innovation proposed by Joseph Alois Schumpeter in 
1911 in his “Theory of Economic Development” is still a valid starting point: the introduction of 
new products, new processes, new final markets and new methods of organising firms as well as 
using new intermediate inputs. Also according to Schumpeter (1947) crucial for innovation are 
the conditions of access to external knowledge (to the firm, the sector, the geographical area, the 
country). 
Schumpeter (1911) had argued that innovation necessarily provides the foundation for 
economic growth, since it consists of building new domains of value creation, which therefore 
expand the stream of values that are distributed and exchanged through the circular flow of 
income. The regular circular flow of income, which is the focus of most traditional analysis of 
markets or exchange processes in modern economics, is thereby continuously disturbed and 
disrupted through the establishment of new fields of value creation or production. A post-war 
Schumpeterian perspective has built upon this insight by contending that innovation – building 
new areas of value creation – relies on the localised development of technological or social 
 
6capability, through problem-solving or learning activities principally within (and between) firms 
(see e.g. Pavitt 1999). The development of new products and processes is the outcome of a path-
dependent building upon established capabilities and achievements, by the critical revision of 
emergent new products or methods and the search for novelty of a kind that is relevant to 
addressing in new ways producer problems or user needs (Dosi 2000). Hence, innovation must 
be understood as a continuous learning process in firms supported by other institutions, and not 
as a discrete event, whether an exogenous shock that gives rise to a monopoly or a flash of 
entrepreneurial alertness which requires no resources, nor as the implementation of a fully-
defined and foreseen strategy. Innovation is a problem-solving search that creates and 
continually renews technological or social capability within firms, and is not a search for 
positions of market power as such. This Schumpeterian perspective builds upon and 
amalgamates the conclusions of the work of Usher (1954) and Rosenberg (1976; 1982; 1994) on 
the history of technology, Nelson and Winter (1982) on the evolutionary theory of economic 
change, and Penrose’s (1959) theory of the growth of the firm. Thus, innovation depends upon 
the generation of new capabilities made feasible as the outcome of problem-solving and 
progressive experimentation, the operation of which capabilities adds new value to the existing 
circular stream of income, and thereby creates new profits and higher income. 
In an international context, technological differences have come to be studied as prime 
causes of differences in GDP per capita across countries in the “technology-gap literature” – see 
e.g. Ames and Rosenberg (1963) and Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990). Gerschenkron (1962) had 
pointed out that “backward countries” are presented with an opportunity for great “industrial 
upswing.” Countries that begin behind have the potential to access more advanced technologies 
from existing leaders (Pasinetti 1981). Yet backwardness, also in technological terms, is not just 
an opportunity, but one that has to confront major limiting factors, institutional, financial and 
socio-economic. Therefore, in Gerschenkron’s interpretation of the industrialisation of European 
countries – among which the Italian case received considerable attention – the reduction of the 
gap between backward and advanced countries is far from automatic (Fagerberg 1994). The 
milestone work by Abramovitz (1986) focused attention on the concept of backwardness as an 
opportunity for catching up on technology. His explanation of the rate of productivity growth of 
OECD countries pointed out that differences between productivity levels across countries create 
potential for convergence, provided that countries have the “social capability” to absorb more 
advanced technologies. Abramovitz adopts the concept of “social capability” introduced by 
Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973) to refer to those factors which inform a country’s ability to 
appropriate technological and organisational change and identify them in terms of the extent of 
technical competence – for which education might be a rough proxy – of their political, 
commercial and financial institutions. Yet another limitation to the absorption of technology 
from leading countries is represented by limited “technological congruence” (Abramovitz 1993; 
1994), i.e. economic conditions, such as market size and scale of production, in which new 
technology is generated and embodied (Fagerberg 1994). The (lack of) capacity for international 
transfer of technology is a key concept in the Gerschenkronian interpretative framework, as well 
as in Abramovitz and the technology-gap and catch-up stream of work. 
 
7Once we allow for the fact that the transfer of technology to a new location always 
involves resource costs associated with the adaptation and implementation of technology in a 
different context, it becomes clear that these costs are often considerable (Teece 1977). The 
Schumpeterian approach to the internationalisation of innovation and technology transfer has 
drawn heavily on an evolutionary view of the firm and the industry (Nelson and Winter 1982), 
examining the accumulation of technology within the international networks of multinational 
corporations as a path-dependent corporate learning process (Cantwell 1989; 1991). This 
approach implies a distinctive perspective on technology transfer, being concerned with its 
interaction with learning processes and not just with the immediate exchange of knowledge. In 
particular, once technology is defined broadly as an overall system for production in line with 
the Schumpeterian conceptualisation of innovation outlined above, two components of 
technology can be distinguished (Cantwell 1991). First is the potentially public knowledge 
element of technology, which encompasses codifiable items as represented in the engineering 
blueprints and designs and the scientific knowledge that constitute the narrower definition of 
technology. The potentially public element of technology includes individual practitioners' 
knowledge of the way such scientific and engineering principles are applied, or in other words 
the way things work in practice (Nelson 1982a). Taken as a whole, this potentially public aspect 
of technology is in principle analogous to information, in that it may be exchanged between 
knowledgeable scientists, engineers, and practitioners or managers. However, more accurately 
this element of technology is only potentially public, since devices such as patents or secrecy or 
the specificity of the codes in which it is expressed may delay its actual entry into the public 
domain. 
Unlike the first, the second element of technology is not akin to information but is tacit, 
and is specific to particular firms. This tacit element of technology is embodied in the 
organisational routines and collective expertise or skills of specific production teams (Nelson 
and Winter 1982). This part of technology is derived from and tied to the localised and 
collective learning experience of the teams of a given company through their own development 
of production. Hence, this second aspect refers to the human element of technology, which 
involves some received and accepted ways of achieving effective human interaction in the 
conduct of a productive activity, including the division of labour between actors and the 
coordination of their efforts (North and Wallis 1994; Nelson and Sampat 2001). The second 
element of technology is more often embodied in the practice of specific organisations, and 
sometimes in the way in which some specific organisations regularly and systematically 
combine their activities (whose human or social element of technology thereby may become 
connected), sometimes across national boundaries in the form of international business 
relationships. 
The transmission of technology across countries therefore takes a wide variety of 
organisational or administrative forms, which have evolved over time. Foreign technology can 
be embodied in imported intermediate inputs, capital goods, or skilled migration. It can be 
channelled through FDI through patents registered in the host country by foreigners. It can be 
purchased in disembodied form or it can spread by imitation and reverse engineering (Maskus 
2004; Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella 2008). The form of international technology transfer in 
 
8any given context depends upon local industrial conditions including the levels of capabilities 
already built and acquired by indigenous firms, and local institutional conventions and 
structures. These factors affect both the likely resource costs of alternative modes of technology 
transfer, and the potential for supportive capability building in the local recipient units that 
establish connections with those foreign holders of more advanced technology. 
It is now better understood that firms co-evolve with their institutional environment 
(Murmann 2003; North 1990; Cantwell, Dunning and Lundan 2010), be it in a domestic or 
international context. In the catch-up experience of countries that begin behind, the importance 
of international business connections in a country’s development has been observed repeatedly 
(Dunning and Narula 1996). Yet while international business linkages are part of every 
successful experience of technological and economic catch-up, the form of these international 
relationships has varied considerably (Cantwell and Zhang 2009). FDI provided a primary 
vehicle for international technology transfer in the US before 1914 (from Europe), in interwar 
Japan and post-war Europe (from the US), and more recently most notably in Singapore and 
China. Conversely, in the interwar US or Germany, and in post-war Japan and Korea, 
international trade, licensing and subcontracting were the more important mechanisms for 
international business connections in broad based domestic systems for innovation in which 
large indigenous firms or business groups spanned across industries and provided many internal 
technology spillovers of their own. Over the longer term, changes in the international 
environment influence the form of international business connections relied upon for technology 
transfer, and then within any given period there tends to be a good deal of cross-country 
variation which reflects differences in national industrial and institutional conditions. 
3.  Innovation and Technology Transfer in Italy 
Unified Italy lost ground compared with other European countries for more than 20 years 
after 1861. Its first long period of rapid economic growth since the seventeenth century occurred 
during 1900-1913, roughly coinciding with the Giolittian period.
2 This period of growth 
occurred only after a regime change both in the economic and political spheres in the second 
half of the 1890s. This shift is regarded as allowing the preconditions for Italy to join the 
expansionary international cycle, but also to start catching up with more advanced economies 
(Rossi and Toniolo 1992, p. 544).  
The innovation activity undertaken by Italian firms in this phase was mainly fed by inward 
FDI, investment in foreign-made equipment, and patent applications in Italy by foreigners and 
licensing agreements (Vasta 1999a). The military-industrial complex, a major contributor to 
industrialisation and, in most countries a source of technical progress, imported most of the 
modern technology in the Italian case (Federico 1996; Hertner 1984) 
Also in the electro-technical industry Italy depended on foreign innovation. Equipment 
and material characterised by a high technological content was of foreign origin, particularly 
from Germany, until the WWI, and increasingly from Switzerland. Three out of the top five 
                                                 
2 Some scholars identify a period of fast growth in the 1880s too. See Federico 1996 and Broadberry, Giordano and 
Zollino 2011. 
 
9patenting firms in Italy were German (Siemens & Halske; Siemens-Schukert and AEG). Only 
between 1909 and 1914 did two Italian corporations, CGS and Richard-Ginori, appear in the top 
eight patenting firms. However, these firms manufactured less technologically advanced 
products such as electricity meters and insulators (Vasta 1990; Hertner 1986). A similar 
international division of labour took place in the chemical industry, where Germany 
spearheaded technical progress through the application of scientific research, whereas the Italian 
counterpart was locked in a vicious circle of lower technology, quality and demand. 
Indigenous technological development suffered from various constraints. For instance, the 
engineering industry suffered from a lack of adequate raw materials and limited demand for its 
products as neither agriculture nor the food-processing industries created any significant 
demand for equipment requiring new technologies. This also impeded the specialisation of 
engineering firms needing to produce a range of different products in order to continue their 
trading life (Davis 1991, pp. 98-99). An exception came from Italy’s undisputed technological 
leadership in the most “traditional” textile industry of silk reeling. The modern reeling industry 
developed from the invention of the steam-reeling machine patented by the Frenchman Gensoul 
in 1805. Italy took the lead from France in the early 19th century and kept it for a century, 
introducing a long list of innovations that were implemented on domestically built machines. It 
suffices to mention that already in 1854, only a third of boilers in use in Lombardy were 
imported; fifteen years later 73 out of 75 Italian reeling firms used only domestically built 
machinery (Federico 1997, pp.104-109). But the weaknesses of the Italian machine tool industry 
were such that the industry could not provide for the expanding textile sector, which depended 
on foreign machinery. This also meant building their own repair shops or relying on foreign 
suppliers and technicians. Alessandro Rossi of the Lanificio Rossi in Schio declared in 1881 that 
Italian textile manufacturers had little choice but to buy abroad since foreign machines were 
technically superior and less expensive (Maiocchi 1980, pp. 887-888). Even the construction of 
the railway network, which accelerated between 1861 and 1876, did not promote a domestic 
engineering industry for long. Rails, engines, carriages and trucks continued to be supplied from 
abroad. Iron for bridges was also of foreign origin as the Italian iron and steel industry was 
handicapped by the lack of domestic pit coal (Cafagna 1973, pp. 287-288). 
The first major breakthrough for the Italian engineering industry occurred with the railway 
law of 1885, which gave preference to national products, and further extensions of the railway 
network. A number of specialist works were established, such as Franco Tosi & Co. (1881) and 
Ernesto Breda & Co. (1886), while others, such as Ansaldo, were modernised. This meant 
important investment in machinery imported from the US. Moreover, as a result of the 
preferential policy for Italian-produced goods, foreign companies, German in particular, 
established works in Italy (Davis 1991, pp. 102-103) 
Italian firms were quite proficient in adapting foreign machinery and in combining 
machines of different provenance and vintage - this skill was less developed in heavy industries, 
where plants were mostly bought turnkey (Federico 1996; Giannetti 1994). Italian engineers 
played an important role in this respect. They were able to deal with a variety of technologies 
and use them creatively due to a strong broad education in engineering rather than a specialised 
 
10one (Giannetti 1991).
3 On the other hand the slow pace of technological development provided 
a weak demand for technical skills, thus impeding the start of virtuous circle on a large scale 
(Maiocchi 1980, p. 882).  
In the 1920s and 1930s the growth of the Italian GDP per capita (1.6% p.a.) fell below the 
Western European average (1.9%) (Maddison 2010). Various trends can be identified in those 
two decades, from laissez faire policies and rapid growth in the 1922-1925 period, to severe 
depression (1929-1934) and recovery of industrial production in 1934-1937, driven mainly by 
war-related industries and those industries that benefited from the autarky (Toniolo 1980; Rossi 
and Toniolo 1992, pp. 545-546). 
Recent work has provided a complex picture concerning the introduction of new 
technologies in industry in the interwar years. Overall Italian industry seems heavily dependent 
on foreign technology, but was able to adapt it to the Italian market. Import and imitation of 
technologies from abroad characterised the textile and steel industries, whereas mechanical 
engineering and chemical sectors saw significant investment in autonomous domestic 
innovation activities (Federico and Toninelli 2006; Giannetti 1999).  
Some technological trajectories that had begun at the end of the 19th century and before 
the WWI came to be exploited by the Italian industry in the interwar years. The availability of 
hydroelectric energy made possible various instances of process innovation, such as the 
production of high quality iron and steel from scrap iron, aluminium from bauxite and fertilisers 
from acetylene. The largest Italian chemical company, Montecatini, specialised in the 
production of fertilisers and pesticides applying the Fauser process, i.e. electrolysis of water. 
Fertilisers and pesticides were an important area of growth in the Italian economy in the 1930s 
(Giannetti 1998, pp. 101-107). Moreover, the Fauser process and the process invented by Luigi 
Casale to produce synthetic ammonia and nitrogenous fertilisers were exported since the 1920s. 
However, systematic research and the establishment of labs in the chemical industry began only 
in the 1930s – still on a limited scale. Imports of foreign technology remained important, 
through foreign patenting in Italy, licenses and joint ventures (Giannetti 1998, pp. 112-114). The 
Italian oil industry, with government sponsored Agip, benefited from research by IG Farben and 
Standard Oil. In turn, Montecatini and Fauser agreed to transfer to the German-American cartel 
existing and future patents (Giannetti 1998, p. 114). A notable case of joint venture in the 
chemical industry was Litopane, a joint venture between Montecatini, IG Farben and 
Sachtleben, for the production of dyestuffs and explosives. The import of foreign technology 
was also very important in electro-technical where Italian firms purchased licenses and patents 
from foreign firms: this was the case with Cemsa and Westinghouse, and Galileo Ferraris and 
Tecnomasio and Brown-Boveri (Giannetti 1998, pp. 102-103). 
The short period between the introduction of the autarkic policy (1935) and the beginning 
of the WWII witnessed the establishment of labs and research offices particularly in the 
chemical industry, such as the above-mentioned Montecatini, Snia and Pirelli. Developing new 
                                                 
3 While Giannetti (1999) praises the education in engineering provided by Italian universities, Maiocchi (1980) 
stresses how such education had little practical application. A cultural discrimination against applied science was 
evident in mathematics and physics. 
 
11technologies was considered a matter of national interest. However, the cooperation between 
centres and labs was far less significant than in Germany, US and Japan. 
FDI as a percentage of GDP increased sharply in the 1920s, although these did not reach 
the particularly high levels prior to the WWI (see Section 5.2 in this paper). By the end of the 
1920s the most attractive sectors were textiles, chemicals and electro-mechanics – with 
examples such as the Compagnia Generale di Elettricità, the Italian branch of General Electric – 
rather than utilities and transport as it was the case previously. The 1930s saw a sharp decline in 
FDI, with “coke and petroleum,” “electrical equipment” and “chemicals” being the industries 
with the highest share of foreign capital. Therefore, the interwar period saw a shift of FDI from 
utilities and transport to manufacturing, technology and capital-intensive industries (Colli 2010, 
pp. 93-101). 
The Italian innovation activity measured in terms of Italian patenting abroad began a 
decreasing trend from the second half of the 1920s and remained at a relatively low level until 
the WWII (see Section 4.1). A weak connection between science and industry was considered a 
major weakness of the Italian industrial system.  
In the 1950s Italy had the opportunity to reduce the gap, which had widened during the 
fascist autarky, and engage in the process of technological catch-up with the US (Abramovitz 
1956 and 1989). The Washington-sponsored machinery imports and technical assistance 
programmes were an important channel of American technology. The 1950s and 1960s 
witnessed an expansion in internal demand that enabled the introduction of mass-production 
technologies. The ability to adopt such technologies depended on the considerable increase in 
investment and on the development of the Italian engineering industry, in particular the machine 
tools industry. Imported machinery as a percentage of investment increased significantly from 
1950, with particularly high growth rates in the Italian economic boom of 1959-1961 (see 
Section 5.1). Moreover, the impact of international technology transfer has been enhanced by 
Italian industry’s ability to acquire and diffuse foreign technological knowledge through 
imitation, reverse engineering and adaptation (Antonelli and Barbiellini Amidei 2007, pp. 5 and 
172-173). 
FDI increased sharply from the mid-1950s throughout the 1960s. The common wisdom 
interprets this as due to investments by American multinationals not only in Italy, but also in 
Western Europe. However, recent research highlighted that while American firms were the main 
investors, French, Swiss and British firms owned a significant share of Italian FDI in Italy (Colli 
2010). Particularly relevant were foreign investments in petroleum, electrical equipment, 
chemical industries. 
Between 1956 and 1999 the volume of transactions on patents and designs – registered in 
the Technology Balance of Payments (henceforth TBP) – constantly increased, clearly 
indicating Italy’s increasing integration within a system of international technological exchange. 
Imports of disembodied technology exceeded markedly exports throughout the whole second 
half of the 20th century (Antonelli and Barbiellini Amidei 2011, pp 108-111). In the first decade 
of the new millennium instead, a weakening of technology transactions prevails (see Section 
5.5).  
 
12Information on Italian patenting in the US by sector and technological classes (Cantwell 
2002) provides a valuable insight into the innovation activity generated in the long run 
domestically, especially by Italy’s main corporations (see Section 4.1). Patents granted in the 
US to Italian residents increased both in absolute and relative terms in the 1950s and early 
1960s, with a growth rate almost twice the average of other foreign countries and US residents. 
The upward trend continued till 1972-1973 and the Italian share stabilized at rather low levels in 
respect to other main advanced economies. In respect to foreigner patentees only, the peak of 
the Italian share was already reached in mid-1960s, after which relative values declined. The 
absolute values resumed an upward trend after 1983, but other foreign countries’ patenting in 
the US increased more quickly, hence the Italian decline in relative terms. The main sectors of 
the Italian patenting activity were “Chemicals and allied products,” “Rubber and plastic 
products” and “Machinery, except electrical” (Antonelli and Barbiellini Amidei 2007, pp. 96-
105 and 119). 
If patents provide an understanding of the Italian innovative output, data on expenditure in 
Research and Development provide valuable information on an important input in the more 
formalised innovation activity of medium-sized and big Italian firms (see Section 6.2). Studying 
R&D expenditure (as a percentage of GDP), Italy emerges as a country that – starting from 
comparatively very low levels, 0.6% of GDP in 1963 – was reducing the gap with other major 
OECD countries in the 1960s and 1980s and reached a record 1.3% of GDP in 1990, thus 
progressing from one third to more than half the average figure for the other six main 
industrialised countries. Since the 1990s, however the gap between Italy and the other major 
OECD countries widened with Italy recording 1.1% in 2005, compared to 2.4% in the other six 
countries (Antonelli and Barbiellini Amidei 2007, pp. 55-63).  
4.  The evolution of Italian innovative activity performance  
This section provides a quantitative analysis of the evolution of the (visible) production of 
technological knowledge in Italy over the past 150 years. We invested in an in-depth 
reconstruction of the evolution of Italian innovative effort over the period 1861-2011, which 
should enable us to assess Italy’s relative performance in different sub-periods, and to identify 
phases of technological catch-up and relative lagging behind. 
To stand up to the measurement challenge of accounting for innovation outputs in such a 
long historical time span, we build and cross-check different kinds of indicators, along the wide 
and evolving range of innovative dimensions/activities, trying to track also the less formalised 
factors typical of Italian firms. We provide quantitative evidence on both classic innovative 
activity indicators, such as patents, and proxies of other softer forms of innovation activity, such 
as trademarks, design and models, utility models. We have gathered data through access to 
Italian and foreign statistical and archival sources and constructed time series to be used for our 
subsequent estimation exercise. Depending upon data availability, in some sub-periods the time 
series have been broken down by sector. 
 
13This section and the following two might provide an initial assessment of the extent to 
which our data support the established understanding and knowledge discussed in Section 2 and 
the historical evidence recalled in Section 3. 
4.1 Patenting  activity   
We built quantitative evidence about Italian patenting activity over the past 150 years, in 
an internationally comparative perspective, in several foreign locations, not only, as usually 
done, in the US, but also in various European countries (France, Germany, Spain, UK, 
Switzerland). We also collected data on patents granted in Italy, as well as at the European 
Patent Office for more recent years.
4  
Despite a great deal of theoretical and, above all, empirical approximation, it is accepted 
that statistics regarding patents can be considered a useful measure of the flow of prevalently 
scientific innovation, which bigger firms develop (along with – particularly in the past – 
professional individual inventors). A study of the evolution of patents can contribute to a 
description of the results of some ways of producing scientific and technological knowledge, but 
they certainly cannot be considered a comprehensive and impartial indicator. Firm size 
significantly influences the propensity to take out patents: in patent count statistics innovative 
activity results of large firms are over-represented, while those of small firms are under-
estimated. Moreover patents highlight product innovation which can be copied easily, and does 
not adequately represent innovation processes which are protected by their complexity, 
compactness and the sequence of the productive process. All these caveats strongly apply to the 
Italian case.
5 Still patent data are a necessary complement in any innovation processes’ 
                                                 
4 Our main source for what pertains pre WWII years is “La Propriété industrielle: organe officiel du Bureau 
international de l’Union pour la protection de la propriété industrielle”, in which we found several tables with data 
on patents, trademarks, international trademarks, design and models applied in different countries Patents Offices 
with the details on foreign applicants. Other valuable historical sources were the Journal of the Patent Office 
Society’s data reconstruction (see Federico 1964) as well as World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
publications (see in particular WIPO 1983), and national statistical sources (in particular for Italy see Direzione 
Generale di Statistica 1884-1925; Istituto centrale di statistica del Regno d’Italia 1926-1944; Istat 1949-2010. For 
Spain see Saiz 2005). For recent years we accessed national and international sources (United States Patent and 
Trademark Office-USPTO, European Patent Office-EPO, WIPO). 
5 Statistics regarding patents are a rather partial and selective indicator. Many elements need to be considered to 
adequately evaluate the contribution made by patents as a proxy for intensity and for the results of innovative 
activity (see Griliches 1990; Santarelli and Sterlacchini 1990). Above all, the evaluation must allow for the high 
degree of heterogeneity of the technological and economic value of the various patents. It goes without saying that, 
as much original knowledge is not patented for reasons of secrecy, strategy and cost, the relationship between the 
flows of patent approvals and the flow of new technological knowledge is rather complex and questionable. And it 
is equally true that the technological originality of many patents is actually little and doubtful. Further, not all 
innovations are patented but some tend to be broken up into a number of applications for patents (in certain 
countries and especially in certain sectors). On the other hand, not all patents are destined to become innovations, 
instead they free big multinational firms from the need to control and defend certain markets from potential 
competitors. Also, it is clear that only firms which are very concerned about the low level of “natural” 
appropriability of perfected knowledge consider it opportune to use this instrument. In fact, a different propensity to 
patent is seen not only for different kinds of innovation and enterprises of different size and nationality, but also for 
different product sectors (see Pavitt 1984). 
 
14interpretive picture over the long run, and furthermore the key ingredient of any analysis on 
historical periods of otherwise poor statistical coverage of technological innovation activities.
6 
The collection of evidence on patenting activity abroad other than in the US has not been 
explored frequently over such a long period of time and never, as far as we know, for the Italian 
case. It could well be that in diverse historical phases, we will find different dynamics in Italian 
patenting in US and in the European countries, related to Italy’s trade orientation, light outward 
FDI, migrations destinations, and also to different host countries’ patenting systems – being the 
particularly far and highly competitive US market not the natural first reference for smaller, 
only export internationalized Italian firms.
7 
We obtain interesting results. Italian patenting performance in relative terms – expressed 
by the share of patents granted to Italian residents on total patents granted to foreigners – 
appears in Europe, across the different foreign location surveyed, better than in the US over the 
long run – higher share levels and stronger progresses (Figures 4.1, 4.2-4.5).
8  
In particular Italy’s patents share in Europe improves significantly along the first 
Giolittian phase: the patenting performance of this first catch-up period appears relatively more 
successful – a constantly increasing and higher levels at the peak and relative to Italian 
industrial development at the time; in the 1920s-1930s decades, the Italian gap remains mostly 
stable or widens. In the US instead, Italian levels and progresses were on a lower scale all over 
the first half of the 20th century.  
At the beginning of the 1950s, in comparison with the main industrialised countries, 
Italian residents’ patenting performance abroad was still modest both in Europe and in the 
United States. Since then the Italian catch-up in patenting activity abroad resumed, but it 
registered apparently a step back in diverse patenting locations at mid-1960s at the peak of 
Italian economic boom, in the middle of the so-called Golden Age (Figures 4.7a and 4.7b). 
                                                 
6 Moreover patents make it possible to take account of the results of innovative activity, at least in terms of 
production of technological knowledge, when it is not the result of research and development activity as it is 
traditionally defined. Furthermore, patent statistics make it possible to consider the rather important problem of 
how efficiently research activity and innovation in general is managed. In fact, while R&D expenditure measures 
research activity cost, it certainly does not measure its output. 
7 In the first place, it is clear that the choice, consolidated in wide ranging comparative international research, to 
consider the patents granted by USPTO means to select a rather particular universe, represented by agents who are 
able to operate on the toughest international market and spend a not insignificant sum of money on defending 
(through this particular right of intellectual ownership) their ownership of refined knowledge. The result is that the 
innovative activity of large firms is over-represented, while that of foreign small firms is under-represented. 
Secondly, as obtaining a patent in the US is the result of expensive procedures based on merit (a rather demanding 
procedure which is the main reason for its documentary value) but in return for significant protection and therefore 
an increased degree of “artificial” ownership (guaranteed by a very effective and competent legal tradition in the 
main world market), it is clear that this instrument is used not only by firms which are very concerned about the 
low level of “natural” appropriateness of perfected knowledge, but also by firms pursuing strategies directed to the 
creation of intangible assets, mainly of a financial character, particularly in a highly financially sophisticated 
market such as the US. 
8 The comparison is within “foreign” patents. Host country resident’s patents are excluded, in order to avoid evident 
effects of asymmetry in favour of domestic patenting activity for indigenous firms. 
 
15Interestingly the progress in Italian patenting relative performance is interrupted and partially 
reversed in the case of patents granted by the USPTO, while the latter recover a catch-up path in 
the case of European patent offices. In the 1970s-1980s period in fact, Italian patenting activity 
in European countries seems to be back on a moderately growing track – or on an effective 
defensive one relative to the relentless Japanese new champion – while Italian firms were 
continuously losing ground among USPTO’s patentees. It is worthwhile to recall that the 
statistics regarding patents granted by the USPTO in the second half of the 20th century in 
particular can be considered a useful measure of the flow of science-based innovations, index of 
more formalised, laboratory-based, structured technological innovation activities, which were 
developed mostly by the (few) Italian large corporations. 
Moreover, Italian patenting activity in Europe in the past 150 years apparently 
encountered relatively less difficulties – higher share levels and stronger progresses – in France, 
Spain and Suisse than in Germany especially over the post-WWII period (Figures 4.2-4.5): 
perhaps owing to less strict “Latin” patenting systems and being those countries destination of 
Italian typically softer and intermediate technological innovations.  
Even if we look at the number of domestic patents granted to Italian residents per unit of 
GDP (International GK Dollars; Maddison 2010) – a proxy of innovation activities not always 
close to the international technological frontier – in respect to other countries’ domestic 
performance (French residents’ patents granted in France on French GDP, etc.), a lower than 
average Italian patenting activity output level throughout the whole period emerges, as well as a 
catch-up in the long run leaving a significant gap (Figure 4.6). Interesting are both the relevance 
of the long Giolittian phase progress and the not so remarkable Golden Age performance. In the 
1950-1973 period the Italian economy was able to grow more than average, apparently “saving” 
more than average on domestic patenting as well as on patenting abroad.
9 
Let us now focus on the post-WWII phase (Figures 4.7a, 4.7b). The comparisons between 
Italian patents and other foreign patents issued in the US show: the limited number and share of 
Italian patents in the early 1950s; the relatively vivid growth of the Italian share during the 
“economic miracle years” up to the historical maximum of 4.1% in 1963 (much closer to the 
shares of Italian patents in Europe), and a (limited) catch-up with respect to the main 
industrialized countries, with the significant exception of Germany; the decline of Italy’s patent 
share during the subsequent four decades. Certainly Italy did not experience, not even during its 
economic boom period, any “take-off” in foreign patent activity similar to those of Japan and 
South Korea (since mid-1960s and early 1990s respectively). Excluding Japan (the big winner 
of the post-WWII phase), however, until early 1990s the gap with respect to the other 
industrialized countries narrowed. In the last two decades, instead, the dynamic of Italy’s patent 
activity in the US does not allow any further catch-up, not even against mature competitors.  
Since early 1990s the relative stepping-back of Italian patents seems shared by the two 
sides of the Atlantic (Figures 4.8, 4.9, 4.10a, 4.10b and 4.1-4.5), in this phase the Italian 
                                                 
9 The Golden Age domestic patents’ pattern is substantially mirrored across Italy’s main foreign patenting 
locations, i.e. looking at Italian patents granted in France on Italian GDP in respect to German and other main 
countries’ patents granted in France on their own GDP (data not displayed). 
 
16performance suffer both old and new internal difficulties and structural weaknesses, as well as 
new successful patenting countries – the Far East industrialized tigers, South Korea in 
particular, and Northern Europe bouncing back, Finland first.
10 At European Patent Office, 
Italian patent applications share decreases less significantly and remains higher than at USPTO, 
while Italian share of patents granted by EPO actually increased in the past 15 years, possibly 
signalling a better relative performance of Italian firms – also small and medium-sized ones – in 
the “easier,” less alien European patenting environment. 
Still today the overall share of patents granted to Italian residents results rather modest, at 
odds with the country’s economic weight, both at USPTO and at EPO. 
We have also collected sectors’ and technological classes’ patent data in order to be able 
to break down by level of technological content the Italian patents granted by the USPTO over 
the whole period under analysis. We calculated the share of Italian sectors’ patents over foreign 
USPTO ones and a revealed technological advantage index – a USPTO patent specialization 
index – in order to identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of Italian technological 
innovative performance over 120 years (Tables 4.1-4.2 and Figure 4.11).
11 
Looking at the first catch-up phase, Italian USPTO patents gained ground (vis-à-vis other 
foreigners in the 1900-1919 in respect to the 1890-1899 period) across several sectors, but in 
particular in the more advanced ones – in rubber, transportation equipments and electrical 
equipments and supplies – resulting specialized in particular in transportation and electrical 
equipments. In the whole interwar period instead, while total Italian patents increased their share 
on foreigners’ ones, they retrenched in crucial advanced chemical and electrical sectors; the 
autarchic phase performance was particularly disappointing, as Italian patents lost ground in 
almost all modern sectors – with the notable exception of rubber, that thus become an area of 
relative specialization next to the resilient transportation equipment one. 
In the second crucial post-WWII catch-up phase, in respect to the Giolittian phase, Italian 
USPTO patents gained significantly ground across all sectors (except a mild transport 
equipment decrease) and more towards traditional and technologically intermediate sectors: 
Italian patents increased their share on foreigners’ ones in textile, machinery and chemicals in 
particular, prefiguring the pattern that will finally prevail in recent decades. This phase induced 
a shift further away from the initial technological specialization in electrical equipments – 
notwithstanding some (transient) 1960s-1970s progress in the more advanced areas of the 
electrical/electronic sector – and in transportation equipments – worsened by a drastic 
retrenchment of the aircraft industry (only very recently partly reversed).
12 
                                                 
10 For the last fifteen years we refer to the Italian patents granted by the USPTO and by the European Patent Office, 
the EPO becoming the only sensible patenting location in Europe, apart from domestic patenting; while until mid-
1990s for continental Europe in general terms we look at France, Germany, Spain and Switzerland. 
11 The index is the ratio of the relative patents share – to foreign patents – of the single Italian industries and of the 
Italian national share. For the 1890-1962 period we rely on the US patent database developed by John Cantwell at 
Rutgers University, with the support of the US Patent and Trademark Office (Cantwell 2002). 
12 Data on USPTO sub-product fields are not displayed. 
 
17Over the long run some light and some pre-eminent dark areas emerge: i) specialization in 
the machinery sector progressed significantly in the long run, crossing the critical level of one 
after WWII and overcoming the 1.5 value in recent years; ii) the process of technological 
specialization in the chemical, rubber and plastic industry, after having proceeded vigorously in 
the 1950s-1960s (with some trouble in the subsequent decades), approached relatively high 
levels for a broader and more advanced set of fields in 2001-2008; iii) the Italian food industry 
and the textile industry reached levels of relative technological specialization after WWII, but 
became areas of high specialization only in recent years, when these two product fields gained 
the highest (and increasing) shares of USPTO patents granted to foreigners (3.5 and 4.2% 
respectively in 2001-2008), in front of the chemicals and machinery fields (with a 3.0% share of 
foreign patents each); iv) started with significant levels of specialisation, the transportation 
equipment industry went through a process of relative technological de-specialisation after the 
1950s, in particular as result of the non-automotive area disappointing performance; v) finally, 
in the sphere of electric and electronic a long run trend of de-specialization prevails with the 
index constantly well below one after WWII, particularly the free-fall of the increasingly crucial 
Information and Communication Technology area – within a generalized retrenching, with the 
only exception of household appliances – hurting in the past three decades. 
Overall, the mechanical industry emerges as having faced the problem of technology and 
made a more than average effort to equip itself with levels of technological skills and innovative 
capacity to sustain its successful presence on national and international markets; industrial 
machinery, in particular, developed a well-structured technological base, establishing itself as an 
area of relative national technological strength (as we will better see in following sections). The 
rejuvenated traditional industries (largely in the area of “made in Italy,” with the branches of 
textiles and clothing, leather and footwear, wood products and furniture, ceramics, food, etc.), 
while increasing the quality content of their output, apparently also increased in recent years 
their involvement in a somehow patent-rewarding innovation activity. The chemical industry – 
notwithstanding an industry downsizing with important casualties – was able in the end to 
broaden its technological specialization over an higher number of product fields, while 
sharpening its technological participation in products niches. Instead, Italy’s patenting profile 
remained seriously inadequate in the ICT field – where Italy had only 19% of its USPTO 
patents in 2001-2008, whereas here 46% of all patents granted by the USPTO, in the same 
period, were concentrated – so that the 1960s Italian firms failed attempt to make their mark in 
the high- tech electronics industry was apparently a serious and persistent problem for the 
evolution of the technological strategies of Italian industry.
13 
4.2  Softer and less formalised innovative activity 
We have also collected data on designs & models and utility models, in order to detect the 
less formalised factors typical of Italian firms: the output of their softer, lower grade 
technological innovative activities. We then try to track Italian trademarks registered abroad – in 
                                                 
13 See Malerba 1988; Malerba, Torrisi and Bussolati 1996; Antonelli and Barbiellini Amidei 2007; Barbiellini 
Amidei and Goldstein 2012. 
 
18different foreign locations – as also trademarks in fact can be a useful complementary indicator 
to the more traditional measures of formalised innovative activity such as patents.  
4.2.1 Design  &  models and utility models  
As soft innovative indicators, design & models applications at the different European 
patent offices should proxy the investment by firms in industrial design activities and light 
product innovation.
14 Apparently in the long run Italian firms were better performing in relative 
terms in these simpler innovative activities. Still since late 19th century until 1930s, the Italian 
share of industrial designs and models deposited in France (Figure 4.12) appears modest in 
respect to other main foreign countries.
15 This not so brilliant Italian firms’ performance up to 
the 1930s is re-enforced when we look at utility models registered in Germany (Figure 4.13). 
These were lower grade patents – with less stringent patentability requirements, shorter term and 
lower fees than patents – whose protection was usually sought for innovations of a marked 
incremental nature, which might not meet the patentability criteria of “inventive step,” but still 
were a junior patent, an intellectual property right (IPR) in need of complying the “novelty” 
requirement.  
Since 1960s instead, the Italian shares of industrial designs deposited and recorded by 
foreigners in the main European countries (Figures 4.14 and 4.15), as well as the total number of 
Italian domestic design and models (data not displayed), appear much closer to its industrialized 
competitors ones, than what emerged for patenting activity. This result might also signal an 
increasing Italian SME’s (light) innovative contribution, partly substitute of a gradually 
weakening more formalised and structured corporate-centred innovation. 
4.2.1 Trademarks 
To better assess the Italian innovative performance in the long run we have also collected 
data on trademarks registered domestically and abroad (France, Germany, UK, US, Switzerland 
and International trademarks registered in Berne). 
Trademarks convey information, telling the customers about new products and their 
qualities (Wilkins 1992). As such, trademarks can be a useful complementary indicator of firms’ 
innovative activity – an underused one in economic history as well as in economics of 
innovation – in particular for analysing product innovation and innovation activities performed 
by smaller firms in low-tech and intermediate industries. In fact innovation studies have shown 
that, as means of appropriating innovation returns, patents tend to rank lower in many firms’ 
preferences, with the exception of a few industries in which they play a really strategic role 
                                                 
14 An industrial design is the independently created, original and industrially reproducible ornamental aspect of an 
industrial product, while an industrial model is any original three-dimensional form which gives a special 
appearance to and can serve as a pattern for industrially producing a good. 
15 Our main sources were “La Propriété industrielle: organe officiel du Bureau international de l’Union pour la 
protection de la propriété industrielle” as well as WIPO publications (see in particular WIPO 1983) and national 
statistical sources (for Italy in particular see Direzione Generale di Statistica 1884-1925; Istituto centrale di 
statistica del Regno d’Italia 1926-1944; Istat 1949-2010). 
 
19(Mendonca, Pereira and Godinho 2004). Trademarks are correlated with innovative efforts, and 
while showing some similarities to patenting patterns, they may be able to reveal many aspects 
of innovation activities otherwise not covered. On the one hand, trademarks are used by a wider 
set of firms, than are patents, especially among small and medium-sized enterprises, since SMEs 
are more likely to be involved in applying for trademark rights, being cheaper and not requiring 
a technological breakthrough, in particular in traditional and intermediate industries. On the 
other hand, the filing of new trademarks, been used by firms as means of reinforcing the 
differentiation of their products and of marketing innovations, may reflect the introduction of 
light design-based product innovations. A trademark-based indicator can significantly contribute 
in capturing relevant outcomes of Italian firms innovation processes not revealed by other 
indicators of innovative activity. 
Notwithstanding its first mover joining of the International Trademarks agreement in 
1883, Italy’s share of international trade marks remained for many decades rather low, being 
until 1930s one tenth of the main players’ ones, France and Germany, less than 4% of total 
trademarks recorded in Geneva (Figure 4.16).
16 It is otherwise true that legally-backed trade 
marks, as an essential intangible asset initially, in particular as company names, were at the time 
“providing the basis” for the rise and establishment of the modern large international 
corporations (Wilkins 1992, p. 87), an area of structural weakness of the Italian business 
environment. 
Italian investment in trademarks revealed innovation activities increased along the post-
WWII decades (Figures 4.17, 4.18, 4.19 and 4.20). Italy’s relative positioning was destined to 
improve in particular since 1970s, both in domestic trademarks registered by residents (on 
GDP), and in trademarks registered by Italians abroad (USPTO, France and Community Trade 
Marks).
17 Italian trademarks’ performance appears again (as for designs & models) much closer 
to its main competitors’ one, than what emerged for patenting activity. Within the EU-15 
countries, in the 2003-2008 period Italy’s Community trademark applications were ranking 
third, after Germany and the UK. Interestingly, while the correlation between the two time 
series of trademarks and patents (registered at home and abroad, expressed as number and share) 
was positive for the most part of the past century, in recent years this correlation turned negative 
(looking at trademarks and patents registered by Italians both at the USPTO and at the European 
Offices).  
 
                                                 
16 Our main sources were “La Propriété industrielle: organe officiel du Bureau international de l’Union pour la 
protection de la propriété industrielle” as well as WIPO publications (see in particular WIPO 1983), and national 
statistical sources (for Italy in particular see Direzione Generale di Statistica 1884-1925; Istituto centrale di 
statistica del Regno d’Italia 1926-1944; Istat 1949-2010). 
17 The Community Trade Mark came into being with the establishment of the OHIM, Office for Harmonization in 
the Internal Market, a EU institution, in 1994. 
 
205.  The import of foreign technologies  
In this section we explore the inflow of foreign technology to Italy through different 
channels, through the production of new empirical evidence on the international transmission of 
technology over the period 1861-2011. We gathered data and build time series of: imports of 
capital goods, differentiated by type and country of origin; inward foreign direct investment; 
patent applications in Italy by foreigners; payments for the purchase by Italian firms of foreign 
disembodied technology. 
 
5.1  Imports of capital goods 
If investment in new machinery has generally represented in the 20th century one of the 
main channels for the introduction of new technologies for the most part of the industrialized 
countries, this was especially true for Italy through investment in foreign produced machinery 
for a relevant part of its 150 years since Unification.
18 
Thanks to the new Italian import and export 1862-1950 Federico et al. (2011) database, 
and relying on different modern national (Istat 1953-1987; Istat and Ice 2000-2009) and 
international sources (OEEC 1951-1958; 1959-1961; OECD 1997; 2011), we are now able to 
build long time series on machinery imports in Italy.  
New data show that machinery imports have a higher and increasing weight as a ratio on 
national investments in machinery (as well as on GDP and on industry value added), during the 
Giolittian phase in respect to the 1920s and 1930s (Figure 5.1). Also in the first period the 
weight of machinery imports appears, mutatis mutandis, higher than the one prevailing after 
WWII (as we will show in Section 6.3), when taking into account the 1950s opening of the 
domestic market with European integration and international commercial liberalizations, as well 
as the new scale of intra-industry trade characterizing the second half of the 20th century. 
The increasing share of machinery imports on total manufactured products imports since 
1890s –18% reached in 1908 – highlights the investment effort in foreign machinery of Italian 
firms during the Giolittian era (Figure 5.2). The imports of specialized machinery, other than 
agricultural machines, became relevant since late 19th century as an amount and a share of total 
machinery imports (Figures 5.3 and 5.4). Interestingly the imports of machine tools, the 
machines needed to make machines, started to grow since 1920s, reaching a significant amount 
and almost 30% of machinery imports at the end of 1930s.
19  
                                                 
18 Classical economic theory from the time of Smith, and Marx has centered the analysis of economic growth on the 
theme of the production of machinery because of its role in the processes of accumulation and innovation. In the 
last decades especially through the historical research on the technological evolution of industry, the understanding 
of the role of capital goods in the growth of the economy and in the innovative processes has improved (see 
Rosenberg 1963; 1982; Rosenberg and Mowery 1998). 
19 We collected soft data, historical evidence on the development of the specialized machinery industry in Italy and 
its relation with machine tools imports, as a national machine tools industry mostly developed in Italy later in the 
1960s (see Section 6.3). The machine tool industry has been seen in economic historians analyses as a crucial 
mechanism in the spread of technological innovation: in the US industry, in particular, in the 19th century for the 
 
21Even in the second catch-up phase the ability to adopt external foreign knowledge 
depended initially on imports of foreign machinery. In the first two decades after WWII, 
however, a process of quantitative and qualitative growth of the rising Italian machinery 
industry was set in motion (as we will see in Section 6.3) as a result of the tremendous increase 
of foreign capital goods purchases of early 1950s and 1960s, when machinery accounted for 
historically high 25% of all Italian manufactured goods imports (Figure 5.2). Subsequently this 
percentage in fact fell over time down to only 10% in recent years, Italian machinery exports 
grew strongly in the long run and the balance of specific commercial trade in capital goods was 
positive from 1965 onwards.  
5.2  Inward Foreign Direct Investments 
We also produced new time series on FDI inward in Italy in the past 150 years, working 
on data from various historical and contemporary sources.
20 From these new estimates we see: 
i) in the first half of the 20th century a relatively high weight of FDI on GDP during the 
Giolittian phase; ii) after WWII, a FDI ratio increasing only until mid-1970s – from the 
historically low levels reached at the end of the fascist period; iii) since 1990s with the new 
globalised environment, a shifting of inward FDI to levels of a higher scale (Figure 5.5). In 
order to evaluate recent Italian FDI figures, we looked at data for different advanced countries 
for the last three decades: while until the 1980s the Italian experience as an FDI recipient was 
not so different in a international comparison, since 1990 – notwithstanding the sharp rise of the 
FDI/GDP index – Italian inward FDI remains anchored at much lower levels than its main 
trading partners, as especially relative to France (Figure 5.6), Spain and the UK, but also in 
respect to Germany. 
5.3 Patent  applications  in Italy by foreigners  
Another relevant indicator of foreign technology influx in Italian technological set is the 
number of patents applied by foreigners at the Italian Ufficio dei brevetti.
21 The number of 
foreign patents per unit of Italian industry value added increases since 1880s, reaching at the end 
of the Giolittian phase its historically highest values (Figure 5.7). It is notable that the ratio of 
foreigners’ patents on the share of Italy’s GDP (as well as foreigners’ share of domestic total 
patents) has been mostly higher than other countries’ ones (US, France, Germany and Spain) for 
most of the time up to the 1930s, again quite high in the 1950s-1960s, while it decreased to 
lower than average levels in the 1970s (Figure 5.8).  
                                                 
 
expansion of productive technology based on interchangeable components; at the beginning of the 20th century for 
the advent of methods of mass production. 
20 Direzione Generale di Statistica 1884-1905, for the 1884-1905 period; Colli 2010; UIC 1995; International 
Monetary Fund 1948-2010; Unctad 1991-2009. 
21 Our main sources were “La Propriété industrielle: organe officiel du Bureau international de l’Union pour la 
protection de la propriété industrielle” as well as WIPO publications (see in particular WIPO 1983 ; Direzione 
Generale di Statistica 1884-1925; Istituto centrale di statistica del Regno d’Italia 1926-1944; Istat 1949-2010). 
 
225.4  Foreign technical assistance and the Marshall Plan after WWII 
The European Recovery Program (ERP) – or Marshall Plan , a milestone in the history of 
Europe after the WWII – is particularly relevant to this paper in that it was an important channel 
for transferring American technology to European countries.
22 
Funds made available under the Marshall Plan came in the form of grants, loans and 
conditional aid, with this last type of aid intended to support trade within Europe and facilitate 
the operation of the European Payment Union. Grants and loans were to be used to import goods 
and services procured mostly in the US, that would be sold in the country of destination. The 
funds raised by selling the products would constitute the counter-part fund.
23 
In this context, we want to focus in particular on the composition of goods and services 
transferred to Italy. Table 5.1 clearly indicates the surge in the importance of shipments of 
foreign machinery and vehicles since 1950. Table 5.2 below confirms this and provides more 
detailed information on the type of machinery imported, showing the increased weight of metal 
working machinery and machine tools in 1952 the most relevant kind of ERP funded imports.  
The appearance of “technicians, designers and patents” in 1950 in Table 5.2, indicates the 
inception of the Technical Assistance and Productivity Program (TAP). The TAP was 
introduced in the ERP in 1949 as the productivity gap between the US and Western Europe was 
perceived as widening. Italy benefited of 26 mlm US Dollars of US funds committed to the 
Technical Assistance Program (not including matching funding from Italy’s authorities), as the 
third major world wide recipient, after France and Germany with 29 and 28 millions 
respectively (Comin and Hobijn 2010; Tiratsoo 2000). The TAP involved the lending of US 
specialists to Europe and study visits to the US of European teams. Over the period 1949-1969 
the average number of industrial trainees per year that visited the United States from Italy was 
63, less than half those sent by France and Germany, and ranked only eight over all countries 
(Comin and Hobijn 2010).  
The counterpart funds represented an important reserve of domestic currency and could be 
used either for modernization of economic sectors or for some other goals (subject to the 
approval of the ECA); various countries decided to use them in various ways. Interestingly, Italy 
used a relevant share of its counterpart funds (over 15% and 80 mln US Dollars; see Table 5.3) 
– and much more than other countries – to promote domestic production of machinery, making 
this its third more relevant destination of funds (after investment in transport and 
                                                 
22 One of the main factors behind the launch of the ERP in April 1948 was the awareness that the economic 
reconstruction of Europe required an extensive American contribution, if the US wanted to pursue its paramount 
economic aim of building a multilateral world trading system (Milward 1984, pp. 90-93). The fear that an 
impoverished Western Europe would be more likely to turn to communism was a further important trigger behind 
the ERP (Tiratsoo and Tomlison 1997). According to the US Secretary of State, George Marshall, the 
reconstruction of Europe aimed at creating a political and social environment in which “free institutions” could 
prosper (Killick 1997, pp.80-81). 
23 Countries submitted their long-term plan to the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and 
the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), and in turn annual and quarterly plans were agreed with the 
relevant government (Brown and Opie 1953, pp. 177-213; Fauri 2010, pp. 157-165; Zamagni 2003, pp. 325-336). 
 
23communications infrastructures and agriculture).
24 A significant amount of money, and more 
than Germany and France, was also devoted to sustain Technical Assistance programs (5.6 mln 
US Dollars almost 1% of the total Italian Funds). 
5.5  The purchase of foreign disembodied technology 
We collected data on the transactions in the Italian Technology Balance of Payments 
(TBP) since 1956 from Italian official sources (Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi and Banca d’Italia) so 
as to build time series of Italian purchases of disembodied technological knowledge developed 
abroad.
25 
The purchases by Italian firms of not-incorporated foreign technological knowledge 
appear to be significant since mid-1950s (when national data become available) and have 
experienced a dramatic increase during the early 1960s Italian economic boom (Figure 5.9). 
Until mid-1980s, Italian technological acquisition registered in the TBP experienced a sustained 
growth, reaching a value equal to 0.35% of GDP. Up to early 1990s, Italy’s effort to purchase 
technology abroad stands out among OECD countries (Figure 5.10). When we consider that the 
national R&D/GDP ratio was under 1% for the most part of the period, it is then clear that the 
disembodied foreign technology imported was a crucial input of Italian innovative activity over 
the second half of the 20th century, during the Golden Age era and beyond. Since the beginning 
of the new millennium instead, the investment in disembodied foreign technology as a share of 
GDP dropped to the levels prevailing at the beginning of the 1960s, without signs of any 
significant “technological emancipation” on the receipts side of the TBP (see below, Section 
6.4).
26 Also the Italian share of total TBP expenses of main OECD countries decreased 
significantly. 
6.  Absorptive capability and domestic innovative capacity 
We then collected data and built time series of four set of variables able to illustrate the 
building process of the national absorptive capacity – i.e. the capability to adapt and adopt 
foreign technologies – and the development of a domestic innovative system: technical human 
capital; R&D expenditures; sales abroad of disembodied technological knowledge; domestic 
production of industrial machinery. 
                                                 
24 France and Germany used them for investment mainly in the energy sector (see Table 5.3) and Great Britain and 
Norway to reduce their public debt (Fauri 2010, p. 173). 
25 Our main sources were: since 1990s, UIC 1996, Banca d’Italia 1997-2009; for previous years, see Antonelli and 
Barbiellini Amidei 2007. The Technology Balance of Payments records expenses and income related to 
international transactions of disembodied technology, such as patents, trademarks, designs and technical assistance. 
26 Recent developments of the Payments side of the TBP could even be related to the lower and weakened 
involvement of foreign multinational and their subsidiaries in the Italian productive and technological system in 
recent years. 
 
246.1  Technical human capital  
We firstly collected data on engineers enrolled in Italian universities over the past 150 
years so as to proxy the accumulation of higher technical skills. From the new time series of the 
number of enrolled engineers as a percentage of university students since 1862 – built accessing 
different historical and contemporary official sources – three main results emerge (Figure 6.1):
27 
i) the remarkable growth and weight reached by the share of engineers on total university 
students during the Giolittian phase until 1920;
 ii) the subsequent dramatic decline, following 
Gentile’s reform of the fascist period;
28 iii) the not so impressive growth of engineering students 
in the post-WWII period that result after having subtracted – as almost never is done – the 
students enrolled in engineering universities but following architectural studies.  
Only prior and during the first Italian catch-up, the Italian educational system made a 
significant selective investment in science-based educated technical human capital.
29 Yet at the 
middle of the 20th century Italy had accumulated an adequate stock of high technical human 
capital as a result of its post-Unification investments in engineering graduate studies. After the 
Golden Age mild growth of the investment in engineering education, the 1970s and 1990s 
engineers’ enrollment relative retrenching has probably been increasingly hurting in recent 
years.
30 
We then looked at the evolution of the intermediate technical skills endowment as proxied 
by the number of technicians educated in Italian schools over the long run.
 From the new time 
series on students enrolled in technical schools since 1861 interesting results emerge as well 
(Figure 6.2).
31 Firstly, the early and significant growth of the share of students enrolled in 
industrial lower secondary schools was not matched by a similar investment in intermediate 
technical education. The students enrolled in technical high schools lagged behind and started to 
grow significantly only in the first decade of the 20th century, when the Giolittian catch-up was 
already well in motion, becoming a relevant share of secondary education only in the 1920s and 
for a brief period. Moreover technical high schools of the Giolittian phase were more focused on 
commercial professions’ education than on industrial production needs. Interestingly, a small 
but qualified part of industrial lower secondary schools, often sponsored by local firms and 
business institutions, resulted a key element in the development of local endowments of 
manufacturing skills in scattered areas of North and Centre Italy regions (notably Lombardia 
                                                 
27 Our main sources were: Direzione Generale di Statistica 1884-1925, Istituto centrale di statistica del Regno 
d’Italia 1926-1944, Istat 1949-2010; 1950-1972; 1973-1990; 1987-1998. 
28 See Bertola and Sestito 2011 for a description of Gentile reform. 
29 See Lacaita 1973; Zamagni 1978; Vasta 1999a; 1999b. 
30 Net of the architecture and building field, the share of students enrolled in engineering on total university 
students in 2009 was lower (and decreasing) in Italy (9%), relative to (the not too much dissimilar educational 
systems of) France, Germany (10.5 and 11.9% respectively, both increasing in recent years), and European Union 
(10.1%); see Eurostat 2010.  
31 Our main sources were: Direzione Generale di Statistica 1884-1925, Istituto centrale di statistica del Regno 
d’Italia 1926-1944, Istat 1949-2010; 1950-1972; 1973-1990; 1989-1998. 
 
25and Marche).
32 Secondly, following the establishment of Gentile’s new educational system, a 
decline of all kind of technical education prevailed. Thirdly, strong and continuous growth of a 
new technical high school education (Istituti tecnici superiori), with a broader and deeper 
epistemic base and more focused on business production needs, marked the second half of the 
20th century.
 33 
After WWII structural change in Italy was accompanied on a much lesser scale by a 
general increase in the investment in human capital (classified according to the levels of 
education) with respect to other industrialised countries, as well as relative to the investment in 
physical capital. In early 1950s, Italian workforce had low levels of human capital acquired by 
means of formal training and education, not only with respect to the US, but also to many 
European countries and Japan.
34 Italy had a qualitatively good supply of engineers and a trained 
on-the-job workforce. The average level of education rose dramatically during the fifty years 
after WWII, but the most significant quantitative progress took place since mid-1950s for what 
pertains high school education, only since late 1960s in terms of university education (Figures 
6.1 and 6.2).
35  
Prior and during the second Italian catch-up a relevant investment was done in intermediate 
technical human capital. The increased investment in the technical secondary education was 
important in this phase for the development of the national absorptive capacity. In this period 
Italian industry, and the mechanical sector in particular, benefited from the new relative 
abundance of technicians educated and trained in the Istituti tecnici industriali (Figure 6.3).
36 
This educated human capital, endowed with good structured technical skills with some 
epistemic base, fruitfully matched the industry’s internal development of skilled labor, and was 
pivotal to develop and successfully exploit technological innovations along vertical 
manufacturing filieres (Antonelli and Barbiellini Amidei 2011, pp. 126-127 and 174-175). 
However at mid-1960s, after two decades of dramatic growth, the industrial technical high 
schools – driving force and core component of the new technical education – stopped gaining 
weight within total technical education (Figure 6.2); the decline of the share of students enrolled 
in industrial technical high schools, evident since mid-1970s, combined with an increasingly 
damaging quality loss, brought the industrial section of higher technical education to 
                                                 
32 See Zamagni 1996; Moroni 2002; Lacaita 2009.  
33 See Genovesi 1998; Vasta 1999a; 1999b; Zamagni 2002. 
34 See Maddison 1995. 
35 Moreover, up to the end of the 1960s, scientific studies at university were in decline both for enrolled and 
graduates. Despite improvements, large gaps remained in the area of formal education. Even as late as 1977 little 
more than 40% of those employed had finished middle school and the percentage of graduates in the working 
population remained comparatively low (see Vasta 1999b). See Bertola and Sestito 2011. 
36 The “Istituto tecnico industriale” was developed in the post-WWII educational system as a 5 year secondary 
school teaching technical-scientific subjects relevant for industrial technology development (mechanical 
engineering, electrical engineering, measures, fluid dynamic, automation, material technology, etc.). The number of 
“Istituti tecnici industriali” increased from 89 in 1949, to 434 in 1969, and to 636 in 1979. In the course of 1950s 
among Italian firms emerged the tendency to use educated technicians – in addition to skillful heads of units 
coming from rows of the workers – to cover the chief technician (capo tecnico) functions in the production lines. 
 
26progressively lose its leading role. In the 1990s the ratio of industrial high schools students on 
industry’s employees started to retrench. The need for a new technical high school was 
recognised since 1970s, but for decades the institutional answer was not able to meet this need, 
never going beyond the project stage.
37 
6.2  Research and development investment  
The statistical data on R&D expenditures – available for Italy as well as for other main 
industrialised countries only since early 1960s – confirm that in Italy both the public sector and 
above all the business sector historically invested few resources in research activities.  
The overall volume of Italian R&D expenditure (gross domestic expenditure on R&D or 
GERD), starting from a rather modest figure, increased both in absolute terms and relative to 
GDP in the 1960s and 1980s in particular, due to a higher R&D activity taking place both in the 
business and the public sector (Figures 6.4 and 6.5): R&D passed from 0.6% of GDP in 1963, 
compared to an average 1.9% for the six main OECD countries, to 0.8% in the mid-1970s to a 
record 1.3 in the early 1990s, compared to an average international value of 2.0% and 2.3% 
respectively.  
Since the 1990s instead the gap between Italy and the other major OECD countries 
widened with Italy down to 1.2% in 2008, when the international counterpart recorded 2.4%. 
The gap to the other main industrialized countries is still considerable and the R&D/GDP ratio 
remains anchored at rather low levels, incompatible with Italy’s economic position on the 
international scene.
38  
The extreme character of these figures suggest that, in Italy in particular, R&D 
expenditures cover only a limited part of the production of technological knowledge useful for 
industrial innovation.
39 Such expenditures reflect in fact a kind of behaviour and operational 
criteria typical of large firms active in sectors with a strong scientific base, with laboratories and 
scientific staff quite rare in the Italian industrial landscape. Most of Italian industry is 
characterized – increasingly since 1970s – by a completely different kind of firms, more often 
small to medium, active in traditional and technologically intermediate sectors. The particular 
dimensional structure of the Italian industrial system is, in fact, the main determinant of the low 
                                                 
37 One of the few new accomplishments in this area is perhaps the start in 2011-12 of a new non-academic technical 
higher education institution (Istituti Tecnici Superiori) supposed to train specialized technicians closer to the 
business needs of new high-tech or otherwise innovative Italian industries. 
38 Also limiting the comparison to R&D civil programmes, a significant gap persists. 
39 It is nowadays generally acknowledged that R&D data can document only a part, a rather specific and limited 
part, of the more complex range of activities aimed at producing technological knowledge and eventually the 
introduction of technological and organisational innovation. The size of the firm, the sector and product 
specialisation must be considered very carefully when R&D is analysed as an indicator of activities directed 
towards innovation, being product or process innovation, the introduction of new kinds of intermediate inputs, the 
development of new organisational models or the exploration of new territorial and product markets. This indicator, 
covering activities mostly carried out by large firms and in large state and private research laboratories and 
favouring formalised heavily science oriented research activity, in fact can describe the evolution of a rather limited 
sub-group of innovative initiatives, especially in the Italian case. 
 
27level of R&D activity; the original specialization model, biased towards traditional sectors, 
being the second major determinant of the low involvement of domestic firms in R&D 
activity.
40 
The investment effort of Italian private enterprises has a crucial part in explaining the long 
run evolution of Italian R&D. The weight of business enterprise sector R&D expenditure 
(BERD), notwithstanding the initial long upward trend, remained relatively modest in 
comparison to the other most industrialized countries (Figure 6.6). While in the phase of closing 
the gap, the corporate system acted as the driving force of R&D growth, with a particularly 
relevant role of state enterprises in the 1980s, the re-opening of the gap since early 1990s had 
much to do with the weakening of R&D investment of Italian private and privatized business 
sector, as well as with the shrinking of the corporate part of it.
41  
The evolution of the pattern of R&D expenditure by sector reveals some interesting 
trends: while the 1960s and 1970s were characterized by the growth of R&D in sectors at the 
technological frontier (in the fields of electronics, chemicals, nuclear power); since the 1980s 
there has been a relative fall in research activity in high-tech industries and an intensification in 
intermediate technological industries (automotive industry, machinery, electrical appliances).
42 
In the long run, the mechanical industry, in particular, made up ground and machine tools and 
robotics were among the very few Italian industries showing R&D/turnover ratios in line with 
foreign competitors.
43 
6.3 Domestic  machinery  industry 
After 80 years in which Italian industry (and agriculture) depended decisively on 
machinery and equipments imported from abroad, innovation and structural change after WWII 
fulfilled the opportunity to develop a domestic machinery industry, crucial in the emerging 
Italian innovation system.
44 Since mid-1950s domestic production started to overcome internal 
investment in machinery and equipments (Figure 6.7). If in the first phase of Italian post-WWII 
catch-up a significant part of investment passed through the purchase of capital goods produced 
abroad, imported machinery, while allowing the access to external foreign knowledge, provided 
an important impulse and was an important input in the process of imitation, creative adoption 
                                                 
40 Up to 1985, the number of firms involved in Istat’s annual census on R&D activity was below number 1000 
units. Recent European Community Innovation Surveys on innovation, taking into account a broader set of firms 
and innovation activity indicators, show more similarity in the share of Italian “innovative” firms recorded by size 
with those of the European partners. 
41 The role of State enterprises was particularly interesting, in that it was a real tool of public research policy and 
played a central role in the (failed) building process of a national innovation system. In Italy, state action to support 
research carried out by (private) firms began only at the end of the 1960s (Law 1076 of 1968, Fondo IMI-Ricerca 
Applicata). See Antonelli 1989; Giannetti and Pastorelli 2007; Antonelli and Barbiellini Amidei 2011. 
42 See Antonelli and Barbiellini Amidei 2011, pp. 93 and 99. 
43 See Onida and Malerba (eds.) 1990; Parolini 1991. 
44 Since the final part of the Giolittian catch-up until early 1930s a mild trend towards a higher domestic coverage 
of internal machinery needs – but still with a ratio below one – prevailed.  
 
28and technological innovation for investing Italian industries as well as for domestic producers of 
capital goods. A part in this process was probably also played by the significant foreign direct 
investments in the machinery and equipments sector (see Colli 2010, p. 106). Increasingly, 
investing industrial firms targeted domestically produced machines. It was with the economic 
boom of early 1960s that internal demand for capital goods exerted decisive pressure on 
domestic industry: the strong and prolonged growth of investment, while initially finding the 
domestic productive structure unprepared and inadequate, set off significant up-grading, 
innovation and development of the sector. As can be seen from the data, since 1965 domestic 
production of capital goods exceeded significantly internal absorption and the balance of 
specific commercial trade in capital goods turned structurally positive. Exports grew strongly in 
the long run and Italy gained in this sector a new significant and long-lasting competitive 
advantage (Figures 6.8 and 6.9).
45 Machinery industry has become one of the main contributor 
of Italian trade surplus: its weight on total manufactured goods exports passed from 3% at the 
eve at the WWII, to 15% in the 1950s and to over 30% in the 2000s (Figure 6.10).  
The emergence of a domestic machinery industry competitive in developing specialized 
machinery, tailored on the needs of the users, resulted a crucial competitive factor for Italian 
industry in the second half of the 20th century (Antonelli and Barbiellini Amidei 2011). 
Through creative adoption, increasingly reshaping foreign technologies so as to enhance their 
technological congruence with respect to the needs and characteristics of the industrial domestic 
users, the development of the Italian capital goods industry resulted in fact in a reduction in the 
price of capital goods, feeding capital deepening, in a decisive boost to the diffusion of 
technological innovation and to productivity growth in important domestic manufacturing 
sectors.  
Starting in the 1960s, domestic demand for investment goods increasingly concerned more 
specialized and technologically sophisticated machinery, stimulating and feeding innovations by 
the national suppliers, shaped through interaction processes with the industrial users. The 
impulse of the demand of the growing Italian consumer durables industries (white goods, cars, 
motorcycles, typewriters, etc.), was important, stimulating more formalised innovative activity, 
through the purchase of licences abroad and the formation of joint research centres.
46 In the 
1970s, the Italian machine tool industry entered a new and important phase of growth, with the 
development of the production of automated numerically controlled machines.
47 In a few years, 
                                                 
45 The Italian share of world exports of machine tools doubled, passing from 2.5% in 1955 to 5.4% in 1965. Italian 
exports of machine tools, despite some dips, continued to increase their share of the international market between 
the 1970s and the 1990s, passing from 7.4% in 1975 to 9.1% in 1990 (in front of the US, while Japanese exports 
managed to gain a quarter of the world market, as more or less the German ones; Mazzoleni 1999). 
46 Notably, the experimental centre UCIMU (Unione Costruttori Italiani Macchine Utensili) and the joint research 
institute RTM (Istituto per le ricerche di tecnologia meccanica e per l’automazione) of Fiat, Finmeccanica and 
Olivetti. In the mid-1960s, while the ratio of R&D to total sales in the Italian mechanical industry was still modest, 
the purchase of know-how from abroad was already considerable. 
47 After WWII, the US machine tool industry (technological and commercial leader from the middle of the 19th 
century, when it replaced British industry) opened a new path of technological innovation: the development of 
automated systems to control the movement of machine tools with high levels of precision (as a result of research 
carried out in the early 1950s at the Servomechanism Laboratory of MIT, with financing from the US Department 
 
29as a result of the access to new foreign technology and of incremental localised innovations, it 
was increased the spectrum of manufacturing processes where the use of numerically controlled 
machine tools was efficient. In particular, numerically controlled machines became attractive for 
small and differentiated production batches, helping the search for productive flexibility.
48 
These technological and productive developments of the machine tool sector favoured the 
spread of decentralization and articulation of manufacturing industry’s productive processes 
across different production units. During the 1980s, Italian producers were increasingly 
competitive in adapting and applying the new technology to their typically specialized and 
customized machinery for traditional industries, thanks to the relationships linking producers, 
users and suppliers of components.
49 Also, since the 1970s the reliance of mechanical industry 
on foreign licences decreased and sales of know-how and technical assistance increased; at the 
end of the 1990s, the machinery sector accounted for a significant share of Italian international 
patenting activity, R&D and sales abroad of not incorporated technology (as seen in Sections 4.1 
and 6.2, see also Section 6.4). 
The innovations incorporated in machinery contributed significantly to increase 
productivity, to improve quality and to widen the variety of products in the downstream 
manufacturing sectors. In particular, the innovative capacity of the Italian machinery industry 
made a significant contribution to the competitiveness of the country’s traditional rejuvenated 
manufacturing sectors.
50 As a result, the machinery sector played a central role in post-WWII 
Italian industry innovative dynamics, as a growing advanced branch of Italy’s productive 
system, as a supplier of goods, vector of technological change, and as a lever for technological 
and organizational innovation in users industries. Machinery industry resulted crucial for the 
diffusion of foreign and indigenous technological innovation through the domestic industrial 
                                                 
 
of Defence). Numerically controlled machinery was produced and used in the United States essentially from the 
early 1960s and quickly reached an appreciable diffusion even among Italian firms. In the 1960s, some Italian firms 
(notably Olivetti and San Giorgio), who were active in the electronics field, developed control systems for domestic 
machine tool producers (see Barbiellini Amidei, Goldstein and Spadoni 2010). Wider diffusion of numerically 
controlled machine tools was reached in the mid-1970s worldwide (see Antonelli and Garofalo 1978). It is 
estimated that in 1978 numerically controlled machinery accounted for 10% of total Italian production compared to 
a little higher share for Germany and double that percentage for the United States and Japan (see Mazzoleni 1999).  
48 Thanks to the improvements in performance and the lower costs made possible by the introduction of control 
systems based on the new technology of the microprocessor and by specific localized innovations. In the 
subsequent years, the growing application of the innovations in microelectronics and information technology made 
available machinery characterized by increasingly flexible automation (typically, flexible automation systems and 
CAD- CAM systems). See Carlsson and Jacobsson 1991. 
49 It is estimated that numerically controlled machines accounted for 38% of all Italian machine tools production in 
1988, compared to a similar share for the United States, a 50% share for Germany and a share of almost 60% for 
Japan (see Mazzoleni 1999). 
50 See Antonelli and Barbiellini Amidei 2011. Strong empirical evidence has emerged from numerous sector 
studies; consider, for example, the analysis of the role of textile machinery in the growth of the textile industry by 
Antonelli, Petit and Tahar 1992; Antonelli and Marchionatti 1998, Belussi and Pilotti 2002 for garment and fashion 
industry; Carlesi, Lanzara and Sbrana 1983 for furniture and paper industry; Bursi 1984 and Russo 1985 for 
ceramic industry; Patrucco 2005 for plastic products industry. 
 
30fabric in the second half of the 20th century. Most recent globalization trends may have 
weakened machinery centred innovation and diffusion processes, as the small size of firms, on 
the one hand, makes it difficult to recreate at an international level, in a global production 
structure, those mechanisms of virtuous interaction between users and producers; on the other 
hand, does not allow to increase investment in formal research and human capital. 
6.4  Exports of disembodied technology and technological recombination  
Tracking exports of disembodied technology and the balance of the Technology Balance 
of Payments since 1950s, we are also able to study the evolution of the Italian relative degree of 
“technological dependence” and the process of technology recombination. 
The TBP was constantly negative until 2005 as imports exceeded markedly exports 
throughout the whole second half of the 20th century. The TBP shows a increasing deficit until 
1973, after which date the deficit decreased partly due to an increase in exports of disembodied 
technology and partly due to a slowdown in the purchase of foreign technology. Since mid-
1970s Italy was increasingly integrated within the system of international technological 
exchange also as a technology supplier. Italian exports of disembodied technology almost 
reached imports and a value of 0.3% of GDP in the second half of 1990s, starting from less than 
0.07% in 1972 (Figures 5.9 and 6.11). The balance turned for the first time positive in recent 
years more as result of a weakening of Italy’s disembodied technology transactions – in a 
dramatically enlarging international market for technologies – than for a truly increased role as 
provider of disembodied technology, as receipts of TBP were again down to 0.2% of Italian 
GDP. 
If we compare the two sides of the TBP, a marked difference in the way not-incorporated 
technology was purchased and transferred in the post-WWII era emerges: 75% of total expenses 
for patents and licences in 1972-1988 vis-à-vis 48% of total receipts from technical assistance 
and designs on average in the same period. This contrast reflected, together with the weakness 
of domestic research activity and industry’s peculiar specialization, the original post-WWII 
emergent Italian innovation system: the relevance of technical assistance and know-how as a 
form of transfer of technology signalled the country’s strength in intermediate technologies 
(mechanics in particular), in rejuvenated traditional technologies (“made in Italy”), and the 
importance of specific and localised learning in industrial innovation processes. The weakness 
of Italian industry in exporting codified not-incorporated knowledge was evident, and ancillary 
to the limited multinational growth of Italian firms, the relatively small amount of resources 
devoted by Italian firms to direct investment abroad, notwithstanding the huge 
internationalization efforts and remarkable accomplishments reflected in export flows.
51 
Also the TBP geographical pattern prevailing until early 1990s – together with the 
technical pattern – revealed Italy’s positioning as an economy which made a heavy and 
systematic use of recombination as the main process to generate new technological knowledge. 
Italy bought (codified) technology from the more industrialized countries (63% of total 
payments in 1972-1988) in the form of greater relative value (patents and licenses) and sold 
                                                 
51 See Barbiellini Amidei and Goldstein 2010; Berta and Onida 2011. 
 
31specific and tacit relationship-based technological knowledge (technical assistance, know-how, 
and designs) to less developed countries (45% of receipts). In the 50 years after WWII Italian 
firms made, in fact, a considerable effort of creative adoption: they acquired codified/scientific 
foreign technological knowledge and used it in processes of technology recombination, which 
allowed adaptation and adoption of imported technology and valorization of specific knowledge 
result of localised learning (Antonelli and Barbiellini Amidei 2011).  
Since mid-1990s a different – and still shaping – phase opened: both the geographical and 
technical pattern of the two sides of the TBP converged. In 2009 Italian international 
technological exchanges appear much more concentrated on EU partners and industrialized 
countries than in the previous decades both for payments and for receipts (62 and 65% with 
European Union countries, 84 and 76% respectively also considering the other more advanced 
countries). Even the differences of the technical pattern of the two sides of the TBP lessened 
(with a lower 18% of expenses for patents in 1996-2009 vis-à-vis an increased 12% of receipts; 
a lower 54% of receipts from technological services in 1996-2009 vis-à-vis 35% of expenses on 
average in the same period). 
Looking at TBP sectoral distribution after the Golden Age a marked concentration of 
technology purchases emerges in the field of electronics (29% in the 1972-1988 period) and of 
sales in the field of chemicals (25%) and mechanics (13%). Since the end of the 1980s the 
traditional sectors of “made in Italy” and since mid-1990s transportation equipments gained 
ground too as sellers of technology. During the first decade of the new millennium mechanics 
became – alongside the transportation equipment industry – the main contributor of the receipts 
side of the TBP (around 15%), exhibiting a steady positive balance, machinery performance 
being particularly relevant. Chemicals, instead, since mid-1990s dropped markedly as exporter 
of technology (below 10%), joining ICT as main net buyer of foreign technology. As a result, 
while mechanics in its many forms has become the keystone of Italian technological system, and 
the chemical industry represents the challenge partly won but partly abandoned, electronics is 
confirmed the Italian technology Achilles’ heel. 
Finally, to gauge the evolving degree of Italian reliance on foreign technological sources 
in the last fifty years, we build a ratio of TBP payments on R&D expenditures (Figure 6.12). 
The relatively high values of the index TBP payments/R&D for the Italian economy until the 
end of the 1990s, more than 30%, recall that the import of foreign disembodied technologies 
was in post-WWII era and until recent years, an integral and crucial part of the national 
innovative effort, a complementary factor to R&D, an important input of Italian industry 
localised innovation processes. At the same time, they point to a hard-won tendency to balance 
domestic and foreign sources of technological knowledge, suggesting that the Italian process of 
“technological emancipation” and the formation of solid autonomous innovative capacity were 
incomplete. Even the drastic decrease showed by the ratio in the past decade, as it is mostly 
explained by the retrenchment of Italian expenses for foreign technologies and marginally by 
the modest increase in domestic R&D investment, signals a not so encouraging tendency 
towards a weaker investment both in the production at home and acquisition from abroad of 




7.  Impact of foreign technology on innovation and productivity: an empirical 
analysis  
In this section we test the relationship between the three sets of variables composing our 
original dataset – innovation activity output, technology import and domestic 
absorptive/innovative capability – so as to understand the contribution of foreign technological 
knowledge to Italian technological innovative activity and productivity growth (inspired by the 
approach of Athreye and Cantwell 2007). We also identify some structural breaks between 
different historical phases (i.e. the first Giolittian era, the Fascist – increasingly closed – 
interwar period, the Golden Age and its aftermath, and the second globalisation phase). 
Although we are aware of the connections and progressive interaction between the two over 
time, we examine separately the determinants of domestic innovative activity performance and 
the determinants of productivity growth in the country. We use a recursive model structure, in 
that we incorporate the output of innovation activity among productivity growth determinants, 
but we recognise that there may be other elements of reverse causation or interdependence that 
it is difficult for us to capture given the complexity of interactions and constraints of the data 
over such a long period. However, we believe that we have captured some of the key empirical 
relationships entailed in the change and evolution over time of the drivers of longer term 
innovation and productivity growth in the Italian case. The main findings we report are quite 
robust with respect to changes in model structure and variable operationalisation, and so paint a 
coherent overall picture, yet our empirical exercise falls more in the multivariate correlation 
analysis category than in a truly causal analysis. 
We begin by examining the determinants of Italian technological innovation in our first 
regression equation:
52 
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All explicative variables are lagged and log-transformed. The dependent variable is a simple 
(unweighted) average of the share of Italian resident inventors in total foreign patenting in 
various host countries (the US, Germany, France and Switzerland historically, and the USPTO 
and the European Patent Office since 1996). We appreciate that this measure better reflects 
                                                 
52 It may be interpreted as an innovation equation drawn from a knowledge generation function – following Nelson 
(1982) and Weitzman (1996 and 1998) – in which the external knowledge, foreign external knowledge in 
particular, is a qualifying input together with internal knowledge obtained by means of research and development 
activities and learning processes. External technological knowledge does not spill freely in the air; if dedicated 
activities are necessary in order to identify, acquire and use it, additional resources and augmented skills are 
necessary in order to fully exploit it and find new uses for it, capitalizing on internal knowledge and the domestic 
factor endowment (Antonelli and Barbiellini Amidei 2011). In this knowledge generation function then enters the 
country absorptive capability, which enhances the matching of internal and external knowledge, which enables 
technological recombination and adaptation of the acquired external/foreign technological knowledge, allowing the 
valorization of internal knowledge and localized learning processes: (i) T = Ab ( DK^a IK^g) with a+g =1; where T 
represents new technological knowledge generated with constant returns to scale by means of domestic/internal 
knowledge (DK) and imported/external knowledge (IK); a and g are their respective output elasticity; Ab is the 
absorptive capability. and the European Patent Office since 1996). We appreciate that this measure better reflects 
innovative activities associated with large industrial firms than with other types of enterprise, 
but with this understanding in mind the patterns revealed are interesting.  
Table 7.1 displays the results of our estimates. In the first equation, we have all the 
relevant variables available for the whole period as determinants. For the sub-periods estimates, 
the least significant variables have been dropped, and the estimates have been replicated without 
such variables. In the estimation over the 1889-2008 period (Table 7.1, Equation 1), we find 
positive and statistically significant coefficients on the variables that express the relevance of 
machinery imports (relative to industry value added), and of engineering human capital (share of 
university students studying engineering). These effects can be readily interpreted as the import 
of technology embodied in machinery and equipment supporting and complementing the 
internal Italian development of innovation processes thanks to the development of indigenous 
technical skills. These combined processes have consistently raised the innovativeness of Italian 
industry over time.  
Inward FDI (ratio on GDP with a five year lag) has a negative effect on Italian innovation, 
where a positive effect might have been expected if FDI is thought of as an alternative means of 
importing technology from abroad. Indeed, it is known that FDI did contribute to the 
establishment of some of the most innovative industries in Italy that were most dependent upon 
large firm R&D, most notably in electrical equipment, chemicals and pharmaceuticals (Colli 
2010). However, taking the period as a whole, and bearing in mind that patenting abroad reflects 
best the innovative efforts of large firms, three observations about these large firms in the Italian 
case help provide an explanation for our finding. First, the largest Italian firms were the ones 
most likely to have been in competition with the inward investments of large foreign-owned 
enterprises. Second, in Italy for a significant part of the period, the largest firms have been quite 
strongly oriented to the domestic market rather than international markets, and in this context 
they have operated in a relatively closed or protected environment, in which they have come to 
depend on various kinds of government support (but R&D public support). Third, and crucially, 
in the research-intensive sectors in which inward FDI in Italy grew most rapidly, the inherited 
technological capability base of large indigenous firms was on average quite weak by 
international standards. 
In examining the varying effects of US FDI in Europe across different host countries and 
industries in the post-war period, Cantwell (1989) showed how the local technological impact 
depended upon the extent of absorptive capacity in indigenous firms. It was when the local 
industry in a host European country had inherited a strong technological tradition from the past 
(such as in the case of the German chemical industry) that inward FDI precipitated an 
indigenous revival and a closing of the post-WWII technology gap with the US. This was due to 
a virtuous cycle of cumulative causation, in which the incoming FDI provided a competitive 
stimulus that reawakened indigenous firms from their relative slumber in what had been a 
cartelised environment, and their research revival helped to engender further foreign-owned 
subsidiary research in the relevant host industry. Instead, vicious cycles may result where local 
companies have a certain technological standing but are significantly behind the leading foreign 
multinationals in their sector (Cantwell 1987). Local large firm innovative activity is eroded by 
 
34the more direct competitive presence of foreign-owned subsidiaries that rely on best practice 
technologies derived from the innovation of their parent companies in their respective home 
countries. 
This scope for vicious cycles, and the domestic policy reaction of further closing and 
protecting the domestic large firm segment of the economy, appears to be a reasonable 
description of the average Italian case when looking at the 120 year period as a whole. The 
relationship of inward FDI with innovative activities in smaller more entrepreneurial export-
oriented Italian firms has been relatively weak as these firms have by and large built their own 
international networks, and as we have remarked their innovation is probably not well reflected 
in our measure.  
Meanwhile, the share of manufacturing industry in total Italian output has had a positive 
(and statistically significant) influence on indigenous technological activities, which is 
consistent with a reading of this variable as an indicator of modernisation and a key driver of 
economic growth over the period as a whole (Kaldor 1957; 1958; 1966), as well as the fact that 
our innovation measure especially captures the activities associated with large industrial firms. 
Turning now to the equivalent estimates for each of our sub-periods, we find that in the 
first Giolittian phase (Table 7.1, Equation 2) we obtain positive and statistically significant 
coefficients on the variables that represent the role of imports of machinery (relative to industry 
value added), and the share of university students studying engineering. This is equivalent to the 
story for the 120 year period as a whole, as we have just recounted, and is in line with our 
expectations. However, in this early phase of Italian development, inward FDI had a positive 
and significant effect on indigenous innovation. This was the period in which German firms 
helped to develop the Italian electro-technical equipment industry, and French and Belgian firms 
contributed to the utilities and transport infrastructure (Colli 2010); while as for Italian 
industries patenting at the USPTO, we have recorded for this period a relative technological 
specialization in electrical and in transportation equipment (Table 4.2). This phase thus has 
some analogies with the experience of interwar Japan, in which local actors learned from the 
direct presence of foreign-owned subsidiaries through inward FDI in the earliest stages of 
industrial development, in some key sectors in which there was indigenous potential for 
development (Cantwell and Zhang 2009). In the Japanese case this occurred especially in 
electrical equipment and motor vehicles – and through a joint venture in the former case and 
local supplier linkages in the latter case – helped to lay the foundation for the post-WWII 
technological success of Toshiba and Toyota. A parallel might also be found in the contribution 
of British textile machinery and synthetic fibre firms, and German dyestuffs firms to the 
development of these industries in the US before 1914. 
Instead, in the Fascist period (Table 7.1, Equation 3) we find positive and statistically 
significant coefficients on the variables that depict the share of university students studying 
engineering, and the share of manufacturing industry in total Italian output. This was a phase of 
increasingly inward-looking development, in which the continued building of local technical 
skills and the commitment to industrialisation were what mattered for innovation. In contrast, 
the imports of machinery and FDI did not play a significant role, although some other 
 
35international connections may have come through the movement of people and individual 
technical and commercial contacts abroad, joint ventures, licence agreements. Nonetheless, the 
relatively limited diffusion of international knowledge-based connections within the domestic 
productive fabric is likely to have slowed down the rate of Italian innovation during these years. 
In the period of the Golden Age and its immediate aftermath (Table 1, Equation 4), we 
find a positive and significant effect of the share of high school students that obtained a 
specialised technical training in the Italian educational system, but a negative effect from inward 
FDI. So, local technical skills – of a different character – continued to matter, but with respect to 
the impact of FDI this is the one phase that matches our finding for the 120 year period as a 
whole, thereby demonstrating a vicious cycle relationship between foreign-owned multinational 
presence and local large firm innovation, as we have argued earlier. During these years the 
innovativeness of the Italian economy depended far more than previously on some smaller new 
entrepreneurial ventures which created their own export networks. Within Italy they were often 
associated with medium-sized internationalized and small firm clusters, as in the archetypal case 
of the industrial districts, which areas tended to be characterised by the limited presence of 
foreign-owned multinationals. Yet in the mainstream large scale domestic industry, in which 
large indigenous firms carried forward some technological capabilities inherited from the 
interwar years, once exposed to a more internationally competitive environment through inward 
FDI – in this phase particularly relevant in the petroleum, electrical equipment and chemicals 
industries (see Section 3) – these capabilities were adversely affected and further investment in 
them was discouraged. 
In an earlier cross-country model depicting how the innovation outputs of countries 
depend upon their international relationships (Athreye and Cantwell 2007), we have 
distinguished between simpler forms of development associated with basic technological 
capabilities and intellectual property creation that rely upon arms-length trade relationships (as 
might be illustrated by machinery imports), and more sophisticated forms of development 
associated with advanced technological capabilities and R&D, relying on the more complex 
kinds of international connections for knowledge development that are provided by FDI. This 
distinction between two types of innovation or technological learning offers a good 
representation of the characteristics of two different phases of development that have been 
commonly observed and which especially reflect the recent East Asian pattern of economic and 
technological development.  
However, as we have discussed elsewhere, the association of these two types of 
development path with an apparent sequence that runs first from an early stage of less R&D-
intensive development, and then to a later more mature stage of more R&D-intensive 
development does not correspond with the Italian experience (Antonelli and Barbiellini Amidei 
2011). Italian technological development has progressed successfully over the course of these 
decades, but it did not follow a path through to more R&D-driven forms of innovation in the 
early post-war period. In the long Golden Age Italy, innovation resulted relatively concentrated 
in intermediate technology, non-high-tech industries, and in terms of business functions it was 
much more incremental, process and design-based rather than R&D-based (as shown in Sections 
4.1 and 4.2). Therefore, the Italian innovation system came to rely mainly on basic technological 
 
36capabilities fostered through trade relationships, often by entrepreneurial exporting firms – 
many small, some large, increasingly medium-sized – rather than by big managerial 
corporations centred on sizeable R&D departments. Consequently, since the first simpler 
incremental type of innovative development just mentioned rather than the second complex type 
characterized Italy from 1950-1980, FDI was not the driver of that development. The 
international business connections on which Italian innovation has relied tended to be mainly 
trade-based, and not FDI-based. 
With respect to the most recent period of renewed globalisation since 1980s (Table 7.1, 
Equations 5 and 6), we find positive and statistically significant coefficients on the share of high 
school students that obtained a specialised technical training in the Italian educational system, 
and the share of manufacturing industry in total Italian output. Somewhat surprisingly, this 
formulation is very similar to the results we reported for the increasingly closed interwar period. 
The principal difference is that while the university education of engineers was the most 
relevant indicator of the local development of technical skills in the earlier stages of economic 
development to the WWII, the high school training of technicians became the more important 
expression of local skill development after the WWII – as this educated intermediate human 
capital was pivotal to the development of technological innovations along vertical 
manufacturing filieres. Inward FDI was no longer significant after 1980, suggesting that any 
vicious cycle of competitive erosion of indigenous large corporations technical capabilities had 
mainly already occurred by that time. 
However, in order to understand the critical structural differences between the 
contemporary era of globalisation and interwar autarchy, we utilised two further variables in a 
second regression equation for our latest period. These are variables that were either not 
available for earlier years, namely R&D domestic effort (as expressed by intramural R&D 
expenditures on GDP), or less relevant in previous phases, namely a measure of a technological 
gap between Italy and the US in terms of the most sophisticated and complex kinds of 
technological knowledge. We measure the latter as the ratio of US invented patents granted in 
Europe (in France and Switzerland, at EPO since 1996) over US population divided by Italian 
invented patents granted abroad in Europe over Italian population with a five years lag. Both our 
R&D and technological gap variables have a positive and significant effect on Italian innovation 
since 1980. This shows that while inward FDI is still not the primary channel through which 
advanced technological knowledge is transferred to indigenous enterprise in Italy, the 
development of local formalised innovative capacity to capture and integrate with foreign 
sources of technological knowledge has become vital in the new era of globalisation. Unlike in 
the interwar increasingly closed period, the capacity to benefit from international knowledge 
flows, as represented here through the combination of our R&D and technological gap variables, 
is a critical part of the story of indigenous innovation. 
In the second stage of our estimation strategy, we have related our import of technology 
and innovation variables to Italian productivity growth (TFP), in the equivalent historical 
phases.  
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where the dependent variable is the Italian economy total factor productivity growth, and 
all explanatory variables are lagged and either log-transformed or growth rates.
53 
Estimating a TFP equation, we evaluate in particular the relationship between Italian 
productivity growth and domestic innovative processes and various administrative modes for the 
import of foreign technology. Table 7.2 displays the results of our estimates. In the first 
equation, we have all the relevant variables available for the whole period as determinants. For 
the sub-period estimates, the least significant variables have been dropped, and the estimates 
have been re-run without such variables. The need to eliminate unnecessary variables, to 
increase degrees of freedom, is stronger for shorter sub-periods. 
Our findings have some significant conceptual or theoretical implications and highlight 
some interesting historical differences. From a conceptual perspective it seems important to 
stress the positive and statistically significant association of domestic innovation activity (as 
expressed by the Italian share of foreign patenting in selected countries, as described above) 
with productivity growth over the whole 1892-2008 period under analysis (Table 7.2, Equation 
1). Therefore, we capture a direct link between the output of our first innovation activity 
equation feeding into our second productivity equation. This innovation activity-TFP growth 
relationship has been widely acknowledged in theoretical and empirical work, as discussed in 
Section 2. 
The growth of inward FDI (on GDP) consistently displays a positive and statistically 
significant correlation with TFP growth. This demonstrates that although inward FDI may have 
had a dampening effect on domestic technological innovation (at least on the innovative efforts 
of larger Italian firms, as revealed by patents) as emerged from the estimation of Equation 7.1, it 
did contribute positively to wider Italian economic growth. It is plausible to hypothesise that 
together with a direct productivity contribution of foreign controlled firms, the adoption and 
adaptation by indigenous Italian firms of FDI channelled foreign technologies (through 
spillovers) was productivity growth-enhancing. While formalised innovation by the largest 
indigenous firms might have been hindered by direct investments undertaken by more 
technologically advanced foreign firms, the FDI recipient business environment (including 
smaller suppliers and equipment users) would have been able to augment its technological and 
organisational capabilities, with positive implications for productivity growth potential.  
We also find positive and statistically significant coefficients on the variables that express 
the productivity gap between Italy and a more mature industrialised economy (namely, the ratio 
of GDP per capita in the UK to that of Italy, with a five year lag) and the relevance of technical 
human capital (expressed by the ratio of engineering students to population). These effects – in 
                                                 
53 We thank Stephen Broadberry, Claire Giordano and Francesco Zollino for providing us with the TFP time series 
(Broadberry, Giordano and Zollino 2011). 
 
38association with the positive impact of the innovation activity variable – are in line with a 
modern catch-up theory, wherein backwardness represents an opportunity for growth, but only 
when coupled with the existence of sufficient/appropriate human capital and absorptive capacity 
(Abramovitz 1986; 1993; Cohen and Levinthal 1990). The positive effect of our productivity 
gap (catch-up) variable also implies that there has been some mechanism for international flows 
of technological knowledge with a public good character to contribute to the productive 
methods in use in Italy over the period, although of course the precise nature of that mechanism 
may have changed over time. The positive impact of human capital on productivity growth, 
while it may have been expected, must be interpreted as supplementary to the positive indirect 
effect of the presence of trained engineers which passes through the innovative activity 
performance variable (patents abroad). 
Some interesting differences emerge when considering individual sub-periods. In the 
Giolittian and in the Fascist periods (Table 7.2, Equations 2 and 3), productivity growth is 
directly associated with foreign inputs, rather than indigenous formalised innovation activity. 
Accordingly, in these sub-period equations, the statistically insignificant effect of domestic 
innovation activity has been dropped. Inward FDI growth directly affected productivity growth 
in the Giolittian and in the Fascist era, while the imports of embodied technology is directly 
(and significantly) associated with productivity growth only in the interwar decades when 
machinery imports show a decreasing trend (Figure 5.1). Similarly to the case of FDI for the full 
period, in the Fascist era imported machinery had a significant impact on productivity growth, 
but not on innovation activity within the same sub-period (Table 7.1, Equation 3). 
Our results suggest also that the domestic ability to produce science-based innovation 
(mainly through formal experimentation, R&D) is significantly and positively associated with 
productivity growth since the post-WWII period (Table 7.2, Equations 4 and 5), which was not 
the case in earlier sub-periods. With respect to the impact of the innovative activity variable on 
productivity, these are the two phases that match our finding for the 120 year period as a whole, 
thereby signalling that formalised innovative activity is a crucial ingredient for productivity 
growth in any modern open economy. 
In the results for the high productivity growth Golden Age sub-period (Table 7.2, 
Equation 4) particularly relevant is the joint significance, which emerges for the first and only 
time in this phase, of the two variables expressing the Italian ability to produce innovations – 
both formalised innovation (as revealed through patents abroad) and indigenous machinery-
embodied innovation (as revealed by the ratio of domestic machinery production to internal 
investment in machinery) – together with the two variables expressing foreign technology 
transfers – in the form of inward FDI and the productivity gap.
54 These results are in line with 
an absorptive capacity enabled catch-up story together with a technological congruence and 
creative adoption story (Abramovitz 1993; 1994; Abramovitz and David 1996; 2001; Fagerberg 
                                                 
54 Admittedly, the variable for “engineers” is not statistically significant. However, the role of indigenous human 
capital is captured to a considerable extent by other variables, notably “Italian patents abroad” (in this phase in 
particular, the variable “technicians” was positive and statistically significant in the estimation of the determinants 
of innovative activity equation, in Table 7.1 Equation 4) and “domestic production of machinery.” 
 
391987; Antonelli 2006): in this phase Italian industry was able to develop a productivity- 
enhancing match of imported technology and domestically generated technological innovation 
(and factor endowment), enjoining a virtuous cycle of imitation, adaptation and localised 
innovation. The Italian growth process demonstrated in the relationship between the upstream 
domestic machinery industry (and intermediary inputs) and the downstream users (medium and 
low-tech consumption good producers) its crucial engine of productivity growth, the specific 
keystone of the system; which increased the dynamic efficiency of the low levels of R&D 
activities and engendered fast rates of diffusion and creative adoption of innovation. It also gave 
life to a system of virtuous interaction between process innovations introduced by adopters and 
product innovations introduced by upstream producers. 
Italian firms’ ability to innovate and sustain productivity growth increased significantly in 
the Golden Age. Previous work has suggested that this occurred mainly through a process of 
imitation and adoption of foreign technology. However two new elements emerge from the 
analysis undertaken in this paper: the novel and extensive dataset used in this work has 
highlighted that in the Italian long Golden Age industry produced appreciable levels of 
formalised innovation and especially considerable levels of incremental, design-based and 
process innovation; the econometric analysis shown in Table 7.2 ascertains that the association 
of technology import with these domestic innovative dynamics had a positive and significant 
impact on the productivity growth of the period.  
Domestic innovation and foreign technology also played an important role in the 
productivity growth in the last sub-period (Table 7.2, Equation 5). The import of disembodied 
technology  – which was possible to include for the last sub-period only, due to the lack of 
continuous data for earlier times – emerges as the most relevant form of international technology 
transfer in recent decades. The significance of the technological balance of payments (licensing) 
expenses variable indicates in the first place an evolution towards relatively more sophisticated 
kinds of international connection for knowledge development, that imply as well the availability 
of sufficiently developed absorptive capacity in the country, so as to enable a profitable 
recombination and widespread use of foreign disembodied technology; and secondly Italian 
participation to the dramatically enlarging international market for technological knowledge. 
However, the positive and statistically significant relationship displayed by these two variables 
in this specific sub-period mostly signals that the declining trend in both domestically generated 
and imported innovation (Figures 4.1 and 5.9) contributed to the decline in TFP growth after the 
early 1990s. Also in this last sub-period the loss of significance of the effect of domestic 
machinery points out to a decreasing role of the machinery centred innovation system in a 
resilient but shrinking Italian industrial sector. 
8. Conclusions 
This paper has explored the long run evolution of Italy’s performance in technological 
innovation as a function of international technology transfers, reconstructing the different phases 
and dimensions of Italian innovative activity, tracking the transfer of foreign technological 
knowledge through a number of channels. The study has assessed the impact of foreign 
technology on Italian innovation activity and productivity growth since the country’s 
 
40unification. This assessment relies on a newly constructed dataset, over the 1861-2009 period, 
composed of variables related to: innovation activity performance (patents, trademarks and 
designs); foreign technology transfer (machinery imports, inward FDI, imports of disembodied 
technological knowledge); domestic absorptive capability (technical human capital, R&D, 
domestic production of machinery). 
For what concerns Italian innovation activity, the information referring to inventions 
patented abroad – index of more formalised, laboratory-based, structured technological 
innovation activities, which were developed mostly by the (few) Italian large corporations – 
reveal that Italian patenting performance progressed over the 20th century, in particular in the 
Giolittian and in the post-WWII catch-up phases, but resulted still modest in relative terms, at 
odds with the country’s economic weight. Italian patent shares over the long run resulted higher 
in Europe, across the different foreign location surveyed, than in the US. Since early 1990s a 
relative stepping-back of Italian patents seems shared by the two sides of the Atlantic. Looking 
at the first catch-up phase, Italian patents abroad gained ground (vis-à-vis other foreigners) in 
particular in the more advanced sectors – in rubber, transportation equipments and electrical 
equipments and supplies. In the second crucial post-WWII catch-up phase, Italian USPTO 
patents gained significantly ground across all sectors but more towards traditional and 
technologically intermediate sectors, prefiguring the pattern that will finally prevail in recent 
decades. Over the long run specialization in the machinery sector progressed significantly; the 
chemical and rubber industry, while losing some patent shares, was able in the end to broaden 
its technological specialization over an higher number of product fields, sharpening its 
technological participation in product niches; the Italian food industry and the textile industry 
reached levels of relative technological specialization after WWII, but became areas of high 
specialization only in recent years. In the sphere of electric and electronic a long run trend of de-
specialization prevailed with the index constantly well below one after WWII, particularly the 
free-fall of the increasingly crucial ICT area hurting in the past three decades. Looking at 
designs & models, utility models and trademarks registered abroad and at home – useful 
complementary indicators (underused in economic history as well as in economics of 
innovation) to the more traditional measures of formalised innovative activity such as patents – 
to track the output of the softer, lower grade, less formalised innovative processes typical of 
Italian firms, a much better Italian relative performance in these simpler innovative activities 
emerged. Since 1960s in particular, the Italian shares of design & models and utility models 
deposited abroad – proxy of the investment in industrial design activities and light product 
innovation, and of markedly incremental innovations respectively – appear much closer to its 
industrialized competitors ones, than what emerged for patenting activity. Also Italian industry’s 
effort in trademarks revealed innovation activities – light design product innovation and 
differentiation, marketing innovations, innovation activities performed by smaller firms in low-
tech and intermediate industries – increased along the post-WWII decades. In recent years, 
Italian trademarks performance resulted again, as for designs & models and utility models, 
much closer to its main competitors ones, than what emerged for patenting activity. 
Turning to the import of foreign technology, our dataset showed that, for a relevant part of 
the past 150 years, investment in foreign produced machinery represented for Italy the main 
 
41channels for the introduction of new technologies. The higher and increasing weight of 
machinery imports as a ratio on national investments in machinery highlights the relevance of 
this technology transfer channel for Italian firms during the Giolittian era in particular. Even in 
the second catch-up phase the ability to adopt external foreign knowledge depended initially on 
imports of foreign machinery, in the first two decades after WWII, however, a process of 
quantitative and qualitative growth of the rising Italian machinery industry was set in motion. 
For what pertains inward FDI as a form of international technology transfer, a relatively high 
weight of FDI on GDP resulted during the Giolittian phase in the first half of the 20th century, 
while after WWII the FDI contribution increased until mid-1970s. Since 1990 Italian inward 
FDI remains anchored at much lower levels than its main trading partners. In early 1950s the 
European Recovery Program (ERP) was very important as a channel for transferring American 
technology to European countries after WWII, to Italy in particular. In the Italian experience, 
metal working machinery and machine tools – machines to make machines – resulted the most 
relevant kind of ERP funded imports, also Italy used a significant share of its counterpart funds 
to promote domestic production of machinery and to sustain Technical Assistance programs. In 
the second half of the 20th century the purchases by Italian firms of disembodied foreign 
technological knowledge – as registered by the Technology Balance of Payments – appears to 
be particularly relevant; up to early 1990s, Italy’s effort to purchase technology abroad stands 
out among OECD countries. Not-incorporated foreign technology was a crucial input of Italian 
innovative activity over the second half of the 20th century, during the Golden Age era and 
beyond. Since the beginning of the new millennium instead, the investment in disembodied 
foreign technology as a share of GDP dropped. 
Looking at the building process of the national absorptive capacity and the development 
of a domestic innovative system, for what concerns human capital, our dataset showed, on the 
one hand, that only prior and during the first Italian catch-up, the Italian educational system did 
a significant selective investment in science-based educated technical human capital. Yet in the 
middle of the 20th century Italy had accumulated an adequate stock of high technical human 
capital as a result of its Giolittian era investments in engineering graduate studies. After the 
Golden Age mild growth instead, the 1970s and 1990s engineers’ enrollment relative 
retrenching has probably been increasingly damaging in recent years. On the other hand, prior 
and during the second Italian catch-up a relevant investment was done in intermediate technical 
human capital. The increased investment in technical secondary education was important in this 
phase for the development of the national capability to adapt the technologies being adopted 
from abroad. The decline of the share of students enrolled in industrial technical high schools, 
evident since mid-1970s, combined with an increasingly hurting quality loss, brought in recent 
decades the industrial section of higher technical education to lose progressively its leading role. 
The statistical data on R&D expenditures since early 1960s confirm that in Italy both the public 
sector and above all the business sector historically invested few resources in research activities. 
After three decades of catch-up, since the 1990s the still considerable gap between Italy and the 
other main industrialized countries widened; the R&D/GDP ratio remains anchored at rather low 
levels, incompatible with Italy’s economic position on the international scene. The particular 
dimensional structure of the Italian industrial system is, in fact, the main determinant of the low 
level of R&D activity; the original specialization model, biased towards traditional sectors, 
 
42being the second major determinant of the low involvement of domestic firms in R&D activity. 
The extreme character of these figures, suggest that, in Italy in particular, R&D expenditures – 
reflecting in fact a kind of behaviour and operational criteria typical of large firms active in 
sectors with a strong scientific base, with laboratories and scientific staff quite rare in the Italian 
industrial landscape – cover only a limited part of the production of technological knowledge 
useful for industrial innovation. After 80 years in which Italian industry (and agriculture) 
depended decisively on machinery and equipments imported from abroad, innovation and 
structural change after WWII fulfilled the opportunity to develop a domestic machinery 
industry, crucial in the emerging Italian innovation system. If in the first phase of Italian post-
WWII catch-up a significant part of investment passed through the purchase of capital goods 
produced abroad, imported machinery, while allowing the access to external foreign knowledge, 
provided an important impulse and was an important input in the process of imitation, creative 
adoption and technological innovation for investing Italian industries as well as for domestic 
producers of capital goods. Since 1965 domestic production of capital goods exceeded 
significantly internal absorption and the balance of specific commercial trade in capital goods 
turned structurally positive. Exports grew strongly in the long run and Italy gained in this sector 
a new significant and long-lasting competitive advantage. The emergence of a domestic 
machinery industry competitive in developing specialized machinery, tailored on the needs of 
the users, resulted a crucial competitive factor for Italian industry in the second half of the 20th 
century. Through creative adoption, increasingly reshaping foreign technologies so as to 
increase their technological congruence with respect to the needs and characteristics of the 
industrial domestic users, the development of the Italian capital goods industry resulted in fact 
in a reduction in the price of capital goods, feeding capital deepening, in a decisive boost to the 
diffusion of technological innovation and to productivity growth in important domestic 
manufacturing sectors. In recent years this machinery industry centred innovative dynamics may 
have been progressively restrained by at least two globalization related factors: as domestic and 
international demand for Italian consumer goods slowed down and was made more uncertain by 
new producer countries entering international markets, internal investment in fixed capital fell 
and the strength of derived demand for capital goods incorporating localized technological 
innovations fell with it; the relative small size of firms makes it difficult on the one hand to 
recreate at an international level, in a global production structure, those mechanisms of virtuous 
interaction between users and producers, on the other hand to make the needed higher 
investments in formal research and human capital. Again the also sectoral Technology Balance 
of Payments time series data showed that in the four decades after WWII Italian firms made, in 
fact, a considerable effort of creative adoption: they acquired codified/scientific foreign 
technological knowledge and used it in processes of technology recombination, which allowed 
adaptation and adoption of imported technology and valorization of specific knowledge result of 
localised learning. In the past decade instead, the retrenchment of Italian expenses for foreign 
technologies registered in the Technology Balance of Payments signals a not so encouraging 
tendency towards a weaker investment in the acquisition from abroad of codified technological 
knowledge, along with a still modest production at home as revealed by modest increases in 
domestic R&D investment. 
 
43The analysis highlights, also by econometric assessment, the significant contribution of 
foreign technology both to innovation activity results and to productivity growth. Differences 
across channels of technology transfer and historical phases emerge, also in connection with the 
evolution of human capital endowment and domestic autonomous innovative capacity. 
Machinery imports contributed positively both to innovation activity and to productivity growth 
(in particular in the first catch-up Giolittian phase); inward FDI contributed positively to 
productivity growth, but not to indigenous innovation activity; the accumulation of technical 
human capital fuelled both.  
The econometric analysis shows that FDI was positively associated with formalised 
innovation only in the Giolittian period, whereas the association is negative and significant for 
the overall period (1889-2008). The indicator of innovation used in this paper, foreign patenting, 
reflects more accurately innovation taking place within large firms. Therefore, our results 
suggest that FDI in technologically advanced sectors hindered new formalised innovation within 
large Italian corporations. Although inward FDI may have had a dampening effect on domestic 
technological innovation (at least on the innovative efforts of larger Italian firms, as revealed by 
patents), it did contribute positively to wider Italian economic growth: imports of foreign 
technology through FDI displayed a consistently positive association with Italian productivity 
growth. The presence of sufficient and appropriate domestic absorptive capacity, human capital 
in particular, was critical, as suggested by an Abramovitz catching-up story. 
To sum up, our results concerning the impact of foreign technology on Italian innovation 
activity, indicate that this took place through a process of adoption and adaptation of foreign 
technology. The import of machinery has a positive impact on Italian innovation as this type of 
imported technology enabled Italian firms to improve on the equipment and, where appropriate, 
to patent such innovation. Similarly, the negative impact of FDI on formalised innovation and 
its positive impact of productivity growth suggests that Italian firms did adapt to their needs and 
markets new technologies and organisational structures. Moreover, this process of adaptation 
was most likely not confined to large firms, but the dynamic Italian SME sector might have 
taken an active role in it; this would also help explain the opposite impact of FDI on Italian 
patenting abroad and on productivity growth. 
In the long Italian Golden Age in particular, for the first time the association of foreign 
technological knowledge (through both inward FDI and the interception/absorption of 
international technological spillovers) with indigenous innovation processes (through both 
formalised innovation activity and the domestically embodied technological progress), 
strengthened productivity significantly. These results are in line with an absorptive capacity 
enabled catch-up story together with a technological congruence and creative adoption story: in 
this phase Italian industry was able to develop a productivity enhancing match of imported 
technology and domestically generated technological innovation (and factor endowment), 
enjoining a virtuous cycle of imitation, adaptation and localised innovation. The Italian growth 
process demonstrated in the relationship between the upstream domestic machinery industry 
(and intermediary inputs) and the downstream users (medium and low-tech consumption good 
producers) a crucial engine of productivity growth, perhaps the specific keystone of the system.  
 
44 
More recently instead (within the last two decades) the dismal productivity growth seems 
directly associated with innovation activity under-performance (especially in ICT) – more 
dependent than in the previous phases on the quantitatively and qualitatively evolution of 
technical human capital and on the poor level of R&D efforts – and with the reduced imports of 
disembodied foreign technology. Also a less effective role of the domestic embodied 
technological change in sustaining productivity growth emerged. The direction of technological 
change, based on digital technology favoring the intensive use of labour with high levels of 
human capital – while the supply of highly educated human capital in Italy was rather limited – 
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Share (%) of Italian patents on total patents granted to foreigners, 1890-2008 - USPTO. 
 
USPTO PRODUCT FIELD  1890-1919 1920-1949 1950-1973 1974-1988  1989-2000 2001-2008
FOOD  1.0 1.3 2.7 2.6 2.8 3.5
TEXTILE  0.2 1.2 3.9 2.2 2.6 4.2
CHEMICALS   1.0 0.9 4.2 4.0 4.0 3.0
PETROLEUM EXTRACTION AND REFINING  0.8 0.7 1.8 1.0 2.3 2.5
RUBBER AND PLASTICS  1.0 2.8 5.0 3.2 3.0 3.2
STONE, GLASS AND CONCRETE  1.1 1.3 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.9
PRIMARY METALS  1.5 1.3 2.3 2.3 1.6 1.8
FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS  0.9 1.6 3.0 2.7 2.8 2.8
MACHINERY, EXCEPT ELECTRICAL  1.0 1.6 3.4 3.7 3.3 3.0
ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT  1.8 1.5 2.3 2.2 1.6 1.1
TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT  2.7 3.5 3.1 2.4 1.9 1.9
PROFESSIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC 
INSTRUMENTS 1.3 1.9 2.3 1.9  1.5 1.8
ALL OTHER SIC'S  1.4 2.5 3.7 3.6 3.3 2.4
TOTAL 1.2 1.7 3.2 3.0  2.5 1.9  




Index of Italian revealed technological advantage, 1890-2008 (USPTO patents). 
 
USPTO PRODUCT FIELD  1890-1919 1920-1949 1950-1963 1964-1973 1974-1988  1989-2000 2001-2008
FOOD  0.79 0.78 1.13 0.65 0.88 1.09 1.80
TEXTILE  0.19 0.73 1.69 1.03 0.72 1.03 2.17
CHEMICALS   0.79 0.54 1.03 1.43 1.33 1.57 1.56
PETROLEUM EXTRACTION AND 
REFINING 
0.63 0.40 0.33 0.79 0.34 0.89 1.29
RUBBER AND PLASTICS  0.83 1.69 2.56 1.35 1.07 1.19 1.64
STONE, GLASS AND CONCRETE  0.89 0.79 0.87 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.97
PRIMARY METALS  1.22 0.76 0.69 0.76 0.77 0.62 0.92
FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS  0.69 0.97 1.22 0.80 0.91 1.10 1.46
MACHINERY, EXCEPT ELECTRICAL  0.79 0.98 1.10 1.07 1.22 1.28 1.53
ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC 
EQUIPMENT  1.44 0.89 0.60 0.77 0.74 0.63 0.59
TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT  2.15 2.09 1.32 0.82 0.81 0.76 0.97
PROFESSIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC 
INSTRUMENTS 
1.04 1.12 0.90 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.93
ALL OTHER SIC'S  1.13 1.48 1.23 1.11 1.19 1.29 1.26  





Composition of shipments to Italy under the European Recovery Programme (percentage) 
 
  1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
Food, feed and fertilizer  45.1 36.6 11.0 3.3  0.8
Fuel 34.9 18.6 10.1 16.2  41.0
Raw materials and semi-finished 
products  19.8 37.1 45.0 48.5 35.8
Machinery and vehicles  0.1 6.9 31.9 31.0  22.4
Miscellaneous and unclassified  0.0 0.8 2.0 1.0  0.0
Total (current $ mill.)  163.1 338.7 261.1 281.1  179.4  














June 1952  Total 
Metal working machinery  0.42 7.17 16.92 17.06  14.89
Machine tools  1.66 21.42 18.74 7.98  14.70
Turbines 0.00 0.43 5.21 18.21  9.33
Mining equipment  5.05 10.24 8.07 6.12  7.64
Electrical machinery and 
apparatus  9.96 7.07 6.08 5.89 6.26
Engines and energy 
generators  0.00 0.00 0.03 13.51 5.30
Aircrafts, parts and 
accessories  1.62 0.37 4.93 0.46 2.29
Tractors 0.00 2.00 2.12 1.89  1.97
Precision tools  8.55 1.14 1.23 1.22  1.34
Technicians, designers and 
patents  0.00 0.00 0.39 1.74 0.84
Agricultural Machinery  1.25 0.48 0.76 0.32  0.55
Railway equipment  0.71 0.44 0.01 0.20  0.18
Motor vehicles, parts and 
accessories  2.08 0.30 0.01 0.03 0.11
Other industrial machinery  68.70 48.94 35.52 25.37  34.61

















Use of Counterpart Funds to Promote Production (US$ mln) 
 
  France Germany  Italy 
Electric, Gas and Power Facilities  724.5 166.6   
Transportation, Shipping, and 
Communications  281.3 56.1 269.9
Agriculture 203.9 70.5  99.5
Coal Mining and Other Mining and 
Quarrying  340.2 82.4  
Primary Metals, Chemicals and Strategic 
Materials  195.1 52.6 20.6
Machinery 10.4 61  83.2
Light Industry  10.8 24   
Petroleum and Coal Products  11.7 10.3   
Technical Assistance    4.6  5.6
Other and Undistributed  157.4 101.3  113.1
Total (mill. Current $)  1935.3 629.4  591.9
 




Innovation activity and foreign technology, Italy 1889-2008: regression analysis; eq. (7.1). 
 
(Dependent variable: Share of Italian patents abroad)    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES  1889-2008 1889-1919 1920-1948 1949-1980 1981-2008 1981-2008
        
Machinery  imports  0.138***  0.445***  -0.0300     
  (0.0444) (0.0743) (0.0312)       
Inward FDI  -0.202***  0.752**  0.0303  -0.157*** 0.105  -0.0342 
  (0.0534) (0.356) (0.0695)  (0.0432) (0.108) (0.0903) 
Technological  gap        0.0869* 
        (0.0442) 
Engineers 0.182**  0.815***  0.288***     
  (0.0803) (0.166) (0.0546)       
Technicians      0.497***  1.021***  0.796* 
      (0.174)  (0.327)  (0.431) 
R&D        1.052*** 
        (0.236) 
Industry  share  0.865***  -0.832 0.304** -0.148  1.528***  1.666*** 
  (0.157) (0.844) (0.131) (0.277) (0.490) (0.343) 
        
Constant -1.989**  -0.534  -0.467  0.464  -6.944***  -6.484***
  (0.601) (2.264) (0.448) (0.800) (1.873) (1.806) 
        
Observations  118  29 27 32 29 29 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.526 0.805 0.520 0.159 0.606 0.854 
F  test  0 5.75e-09  2.82e-05  0.0101  2.44e-08 0   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Productivity, innovation and foreign technology, Italy 1892-2008: regression analysis; eq. (7.2). 
 
(Dependent variable: Total Factor Productivity)   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES  1892-2008 1892-1913 1920-1948 1949-1980  1981-2008
        
Italian patents abroad  0.0369*      0.0494*  0.0349***
 (0.0217)      (0.0287)  (0.0109) 
Machinery imports  0.00149    0.0877**    
  (0.0187)  (0.0379)    
Inward FDI  0.131*** 0.122*** 0.370*** 0.0469**   
  (0.0418) (0.0333) (0.0942) (0.0207)   
TBP  expences       0.0356** 
       (0.0159) 
Engineers 0.0175*  0.0126       
 (0.00943) (0.0148)       
Domestic production of machinery       0.186***  0.0558 
      (0.0503)  (0.0441) 
Productivity gap  0.0892**   0.241  0.0547***   
 (0.0416)    (0.269)  (0.0146)   
Openness -0.00101         
 (0.0327)         
Constant  -0.132 -0.0194 -0.130  -0.922***  -0.305 
  (0.133) (0.0323) (0.155)  (0.256)  (0.218) 
        
Observations 117  22  29  32  28 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.193 0.252 0.462 0.422  0.283 
F  test  0.00245 0.00575 0.00215 0.00389 0.000923 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Italian residents patents granted in the US and in the main European countries as a share 
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